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Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) are characterized by difficulties in social 
interaction and communication. Recent studies within the social sciences have espoused a 
need to reconceptualize autism out of the domain of the intrapersonal and into the realm 
of the sociocultural.  Semi-structured in-depth interviewing was used to examine the self-
perceptions and experiences of twelve people who identified as on the autism spectrum. 
Social scientists have tended to grant the topic of autism to the domain of psychology; as 
a result autistic perception has been stigmatized resulting in the exclusion of autistic 
perspectives in knowledge production on the lived experiences of autistic actors.  
  The first-hand accounts examined in this study lend support to the idea that 
symbolic interactionism provides a more nuanced framework for studying how autistic 
perception influences autistic experience in contrast to the functionalist-reductionist 
approach of cognitive psychology. From this perspective we can position autistic 
differences in disposition and interaction as socioculturally situated rather than as solely a 
result of individual cognitive impairment. The application of microsociological concepts 
to autistic perception and interaction has the potential to expand knowledge on both 
autistic experience and the social construction of normative order. 
Keywords: symbolic interactionism; self; autism;
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Since it was first identified by Leo Kanner and, independently, Hans Asperger in 
the 1940’s, there has been and continues strong debates about what autism “is” and what 
it is caused by. Currently autism is understood as a “lifelong developmental disability that 
affects how a person communicates with and relates to other people. It also affects how 
they make sense of the world around them” (NAS, 2012). Autism is commonly 
characterized as deficits and impairments in social interaction and communication. The 
literature on the nature of autistic selves espouses the view that these impairments 
critically prevent or complicate the ability to empathize and hinders the development of 
self and relationships between self and other.  
Most studies of the self and autism have relied on Baron-Cohen’s concept of 
Theory of Mind (ToM) and focused on autistic actors’ difficulty inferring others’ state of 
mind (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1981). This study discusses the role of ToM in the 
discourse of autism and not its overall value to any discipline. Little research has sought 
to elucidate how or what autistic people think of themselves and their relationship in and 
to the social world. The consequence is that autism is understood as resulting in 
differential self-development and studies of autistic people have focused on these 
differences as deficits and dysfunctions. A criticism of this framework is that what is 
deemed pathologically deviant is a result of larger social forces which designate the 
parameters of normalcy (Milton, 2017; 2014; 2013).  
What does it mean to have a self? Or to have no self-- to imply that some people 
lack the necessary components for personhood, relationships, equality, and thus, 
humanity? This study adds to critical autism studies by using symbolic interactionist (SI) 
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theories to provide an alternate framework for studying autistic selfhood that moves the 
discussion out of the neurological and cognitive realms and into the sociocultural realm. 
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate how, from a sociological perspective, 
difference itself is not sufficient to imply deficiency but that differences have resulted in 
the stigmatization of autistic selfhood and interaction.  
Chapter Two is a review of psychological social psychology literature on autistic 
selfhood and sociality and a discussion of the theoretical assumptions prevalent in the 
research on autism that denies autistic individuals full personhood. Chapter Three 
outlines the SI view of self and interaction and reviews research that demonstrates 
specific SI tenets of what it means to have a self. Chapter Four outlines the present 
study—a SI investigation of how socialization and self are experienced and perceived by 
autistic actors representing a shift from the individual to the social. Chapter Five 
discusses the finding the present study. Lastly, Chapter 6 summarizes the present study 




Chapter Two: Psychological Social Psychology and the Self 
Historical Understanding and Construction of Autism 
Autism has historically been understood as a disorder of the self. Bleuler (1911) is 
credited for first coining the term autism to describe what he viewed as a particular type 
of schizophrenia observed in children that he described as having a unique type of self-
absorption. Both Leo Kanner and Hans Asperger adopted the term autistic in their 
research on, respectively, “early infantile autism” and “autistic psychopathology.” 
Although now largely discredited, Bruno Bettelheim (1956) utilized a psychoanalytic 
approach to autism, drawing parallels between the behaviors of autistic individuals and 
those who experienced trauma in German concentration camps. Bettelheim believed that 
traumatic experiences in early childhood resulted in autism, and like Bleuler, 
conceptualized autism as a form of schizophrenia. It was not until the late 1970’s that 
autism was reconceptualized as a developmental disorder, and only recently has it been 
again reconceptualized as having a neurological basis (Damasio & Maurer, 1978).  
Today autism is regarded as a developmental and neurological disorder that 
occurs along a spectrum from high-functioning to severe. Those described as high-
functioning may be highly verbal, possess a higher than average intelligence, and have 
few social and communicative impairments that require accommodation. On the other 
hand, low-functioning or severe autism is characterized by acute learning disabilities. 
Noting that autism has a high degree of comorbidity is important (Mannion & Leader, 
2013). It is common for an individual to have multiple diagnosis including other 
developmental or physical disabilities or mental disorders including epilepsy, food 
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allergies, unspecified mental or intellectual disabilities, and behavioral disorders that may 
impair their daily functioning. That being said, for some individuals considered low-
functioning, autism may not be their primary diagnosis. Depending on the complexity 
and severity, those with multiple social, communicative, and physical impairments are 
typically considered on the low end of the spectrum.  
Autistic scholars have argued that this language and conceptualization reinforce 
the idea that autism is bimodal. Terms such as high and low-functioning paint a picture of 
autistics that denies the strengths of those understood as low-functioning while de-
emphasizing the challenges faced by those labeled as high-functioning. These terms are 
considered offensive and believed to obscure the nature of autism. Larry Arnold, director 
and trustee of the National Autistic Society, describes his own experience of autism as 
follows:  
… it is like a palette of colors that can be assembled from the primaries. 
To me it is like a landscape where one can move within a specific territory. It has 
mountain tops and deep valleys and if one were to set one’s altimeter at average 
elevation and fly across it one could not do so without crashing in a mountain or 
missing out on the valleys. It has overlapping territories and dual citizenships 
which are fought over. I live where it borders dyslexia and others live close to 
the territory of Tourette’s for instance…” (Arnold, 2013). 
 
 Arnold is drawing attention to the fact that the literature describing autism, 
autistic symptoms, and autistic perceptions is often too simplistic, not representative of, 
and conflicts with the actual experiences of autistic people. Thus, a more nuanced 
understanding of autism leads one to view autism as not one thing with degrees of 
severity but rather a collection of traits that manifest in varying degrees for each 
individual, some of which are not wholly unique to autism (Arnold, 2013). More 
succinctly, no two individuals are alike and all people have unique strengths and 
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weaknesses, which for autistic people is often limited by the structure of the social and 
physical world far more than any perceived personal physiological or psychological 
deficiencies. Furthermore, Arnold’s view questions who can be called authentically 
autistic.  
From a methodological perspective determining who is “authentic”— 
representative of the autistic community—is imperative. Some researchers have included 
students with learning differences or intellectual disabilities and/or other individuals that 
do not necessarily meet the diagnostic criteria for autism. Others have criticized the 
predominance of high-functioning autistics arguing that their symptoms lack the severity 
to aptly represent the nonverbal autistic population. They are not autistic enough. An 
additional criticism is that most of the research has focused on children and adolescents, 
yet little research has explored actors later in the life course. Focusing studies of autism 
on the young has important implications for treatment, support, advocacy, and policy 
change. Work needs to be done to better understand autistic adults who also need 
acceptance and support. As one can easily see, autism is an extremely contested terrain.  
The Self and Autism in Psychological Social Psychology 
Currently, discourse surrounding autism is dominated by the fields of clinical, 
cognitive, and developmental psychology and neurobiology which all adhere to the 
disease, disability, and deficiency (medical) model of autism (Milton, 2012). One popular 
concept used across these disciplines, Baron-Cohen’s Theory of Mind (ToM), claims that 
autistic people are unable to understand that others have their own unique mental states, 
lives, and experiences (Baron-Cohen, 2007). From Baron-Cohen’s point of view, this is 
not merely a peculiarity, but something that people suffer from. According to ToM, 
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autistic individuals do not share the human experience of “mindreading” and thus lack 
empathy. ToM scholars refer to this as mindlblindness—the term used by developmental 
psychologists to refer to children and adults, particularly those with “the biological 
condition of autism,” who ‘suffer’ from and fail to develop the “capacity to mindread in a 
normal way” (Baron-Cohen, 1995, p. 5). This viewpoint suggests that if an individual 
cannot perceive their own mind or the minds of others, then they effectively do not have a 
self. 
Much of the current research on autism has sought to determine physiological 
differences that effect cognitive processing. For example, Lyons and Fitzgerald (2013) 
have investigated the neuroanatomical basis for atypical self-development in autism 
spectrum disorders (ASDs) stating:  
a great majority of self-related processes that are mediated to a 
significant extent by the right hemisphere are impaired in individuals with ASD. 
Additional lines of investigation indicate that an unintegrated sense of self in 
autism is also potentially associated with abnormal functional connectivity and 
an impaired mirror neuron system. Consequences of this atypical sense of self 
are the well documented impairments individuals with ASD experience in the 
social and communication. 
 
Lyons and Fitzgerald represent the view that ASDs are a developmental and 
neurological disorder characterized by physical and processual impairments in brain 
functioning that results in a fragmented and incomplete sense of self. They contend that 
autistic selves are atypical as a consequence of these impaired bodies.  
While Lyons and Fitzgerald acknowledge the perspective of difference is “not 
necessarily deficient and that diminished self-awareness and differences may contribute 
to autistic gifts and talents or otherwise be advantageous,” other scholars double-down on 
the deficiency perspective. For example, in discussing the relationship between ToM and 
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self-development claims have been made that autistic people are “undomesticated 
humans” (Badcock, 2016) and compared with “great apes” (Tomasello, 2005). Stephen 
Pinker has stated, “Together with robots and chimpanzees, people with autism remind us 
that cultural learning is possible only because neurologically normal people have innate 
equipment to accomplish it” (Pinker, 2002, p. 62). As we can see, ToM has led to a 
discourse that problematizes autistic selfhood and interaction to the point of 
dehumanization.  
A methodological criticism of Theory of Mind concerns its validity, reliability, 
and replicability. A recent study by Kulke (2018) and colleagues involved a systematic 
attempt to examine the replicability of four widely used Theory of Mind anticipatory-
looking false belief assessments. Their results concluded that only one (Lows & Watts, 
2013) could be replicated and there were no correlations among the four paradigms in 
tests of their convergent validity. For Kulke and colleagues this indicates that 
experimental tests of ToM are not as reliable or valid as previously assumed which calls 
into question whether conclusions drawn from such assessments are useful. However, the 
assumption that autistic people suffer from a lack empathy and cannot develop a self has 
gone largely unchallenged by social scientists and professionals in the field of education.  
Beyond the social world of psychological science, deficiency rhetoric has entered 
the mainstream domain and is now used by parents and other actors who have their own 
biases toward autism. Activists and social movement organizations routinely use 
scientific and/or medical language to gain credibility (Conrad, 1992; Schneider, 1985). 
Take, for example, the organization Autism Speaks. Autism Speaks mission statement 
states that they seek to “eradicate” autism. While it is generally agreed among scientists 
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that the search for a cure has been entirely unsuccessful and that trying to prevent autism 
does not help individuals living with autism, each year the organization channels 35% of 
their funding toward research seeking a cure—despite the fact most autistic activists say 
that “autism is who we are” (Sinclair, 2005) and they do not want a cure and would prefer 
acceptance and support.  
 Autism Speaks budget states that only four percent is spent on family services 
and accommodations. The language and rhetoric describe broken people that should be 
fixed, drawing parallels to research on other minoritized groups, specifically the deaf and 
gay communities (Davidson, 2008; Dekker, 1999). There is little prioritization of research 
or advocacy that seeks to assist and accommodate autistic individuals. The implication of 
this perspective is the assumption that autistic people should not exist. 
 Neurodiversity is a term used to describe people with Dyslexia, Dyspraxia, 
Tourette’s Syndrome, Attention Deficit Disorders, as well as Autism Spectrum Disorders. 
Autistic scholars and activists have begun to organize and speak out that dominant 
discourse denies the autistic community’s humanity and have argued for the validation of 
autistic experiences from the perspective of neurodiversity or by the application of social 
and cultural models of disability (Sinclair, 1993; Dekker, 1999).  
The social model of disability, according to Shakespeare (2006), is different from 
the traditional medical deficit and disability model in that the latter conceives of autism 
and other disabilities as individual impairments that need to be cured. On the other hand, 
the social model of disability positions disability as a culturally and historically situated 
phenomenon and identifies disabled people as a stigmatized group. This shifts the focus 
from the individual to the social and highlights that non-disabled people, as well as the 
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social structure, contribute to the oppression of disabled people. This perspective is 
uniquely suited to examine autism as something that is more than just an individual 
disorder and deficiency.  
Other social movement organizations such as The Autistic Self-Advocacy 
Network (ASAN) and the Autism Women’s Network have organized in response to the 
lack of representation of autistic voices in advocacy and awareness. Identifying as part of 
the disability rights movement, ASAN aims to influence public understanding and 
legislative policy to promote “a world in which Autistic people enjoy the same access, 
rights, and opportunities as all other citizens, NOT a world without autism” (ASAN, 
Mission Statement, 2016). It remains the responsibility of scholars, however, to 
incorporate autistic experiences and perspectives into the literature by including autistic 
voices in knowledge production to challenge the assumptions and contest the myths 
surrounding the study of autism.  
 
Contesting the Deficiency Paradigm 
Contemporary theories about ToM now invoke and assert multiple cognitive 
phenomena—mentalizing, meta-cognition, mindreading (i.e., understanding 
others' mental states), deducing intentionality, and expressing empathy 
(Boucher 2012, 229). In other words, to lack a theory of mind is not simply to 
lack a theory of other's minds—it is also to lack an awareness of 
one's own mind (Carruthers 1996; McGeer 2004). And so, I am writing this 
essay, presumably unaware of my reader and my (non)self (Yergeau, 2013, p. 




Autistic scholar and activist Damian Milton has argued that psychological social 
psychology research and rhetoric on autism has utilized a functionalist perspective 
(2012). Milton suggests that autism has been deemed pathological “due to the distaste of 
those doing the perceiving and their idealization of cultural and psychological norms” 
(Milton, 2013, p. 9). The application of this pathological label indicates individuals in 
need of treatment and has “focused on the needs of those around the individual, not the 
needs of the individual” (2013, p. 7). For example, the number of articles on the 
stigmatization of parents of autistic children is larger than that of the stigmatization of 
autistic people (Kinnear et al., 2016; Mak & Kwok, 2010; Gray, 2003)He argues that 
embedded within this discourse of autism is a struggle for power.  
Melanie Yergeau, an expert in rhetoric, discusses her own experiences as an 
autistic scholar to demonstrate the ways in which autism discourse and specifically ToM 
denies “autistic people agency by calling into question their very humanity and, in doing 
so, wreak(s) violence on autistic bodies” (2013, p. 1). She notes that autistics are 
disembodied in research and describes her experience being admitted to a mental health 
facility against her will while being told that her protests to commitment were her 
“autism speaking,” subsequently robbing her of agency and autonomy. She was speaking 
but her speech belonged, not to her self, but to autism. Theory of Mind is held as 
empirical fact and is said to be the distinct quality that makes one human. Because 
autistics are believed to lack ToM, they are rhetorically rendered inhuman.   
In discussion of autism as neurodiversity, parallels have been drawn between deaf 
and autistic communities as “both populations have a communication style that is 
different from the norm” (Dekker, 2006), yet, the claim has never been made that the deaf 
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lack a key element of humanity. In contrast to the deficit and deficiency view, autistics 
argue that autism is a unique way of being in the world that is “different, not less” 
(Grandin, 2007). Differences in autistic ways of thinking and perceiving should be 
understood as both alternative communication and consciousness (Grandin and Johnson, 
2005).  
Drawing from the work of autistic activist Jim Sinclair, Lauren R. Strand 
describes the theoretical links between autism, disability studies, and the interlocking 
dimensions of oppression that impact the lives of marginalized people, also known as 
intersectionality, stating that:  
 Returning to the central tenets of intersectionality put forth by Smooth, it 
is evident that the neurodiversity perspective utilized by Robertson and Walker 
addresses the notion that social identity categories and power systems are 
geographically, historically, and culturally specific. Additionally, the authors 
recognize that privilege and marginalization can co-exist for individuals and 
within groups. The third tenet, a commitment to social justice, is inherent within 
the neurodiversity paradigm because its foundational premise is to create more 
recognition, acceptance, and celebration of diverse neurotypes. The fourth 
principle, the dedication to viewing identity categories through an anti-essentialist 
perspective, is present in both the neurodiversity paradigm, as well as in 
statements about those who identify as neurodivergent, such as "the great 
variability among the autistic population" in terms of desires, modes of 
communication, sensory sensitivities, and interests (Sinclair, 2010, Spontaneous 
Interaction section, para. 11; Strand, 2017). 
 
A growing perspective is that autism results in a distinct cultural experience and 
relationship to the social world. It has been said that the internet is to autistics as braille 
was to the deaf community (Davidson, 2008). In other words, the autistic community is 
where the deaf community was a century ago (Davidson, 2008). For example, Joyce 
Davidson contends that “autistic differences in perception and processing tend to involve 
Other ways of being-in-the-world, separate senses of selves and space that give rise to 
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distinctive cultural experience, and so also, cultural expression” (2008, emphasis added). 
Davidson’s study of online communication among autistic individuals demonstrates that 
the internet is a useful and “accommodating medium for those on the spectrum, given 
characteristic preferences for communication at a socio-spatial distance” (2008, p. 1). Her 
research asserts that an autistic culture is flourishing online and that autistic individuals 
can connect with one another via a medium that virtually (in both senses of the term) 
diminishes their social and communication complications. Importantly, Davidson 
suggests that not only is online communication important for autistic sociality and mutual 
support, but it also provides a platform for organization, self-advocacy, and inclusion.  
 
In reviewing autistic culture online such as forums and groups on popular social 
media sites, it is evident that autistics have hopes, dreams, fears, and express a full range 
of human emotion and self-reflection. Along with self-advocacy groups, scholars and 
outspoken autistic voices are beginning to challenge and replace the myths surrounding 
the abilities and dispositions of autistic actors with scholarship that accurately represents 
the autistic experience.  Milton suggests a phenomenological approach based on the 
theories of Goffman, Garfinkel, and Cicourel and sociological concepts such as the social 
construction of disability, normalcy, and stigma to understand the nature of autism and 
social aspects. 
This thesis explores how autistic actors perceive themselves and thus, the 
possibility of the development of a differential as opposed to a deficient self-concept in 
autistic individuals. As we have seen, research has focused on individual cognitive and 
neurological impairments to the exclusion of exploring the lived experiences of autistic 
actors. As we will see, symbolic interactionism can provide an alternate view, a different 
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yard stick so to speak, to both assess and validate autistic social and cultural experiences 
of self and interaction. This way, researchers, doctors, parents, and advocates can begin to 
accept and understand autistic people and their experiences from a sociocultural 
framework, rather than aim to pinpoint was is wrong with autistic people, to fix autistic 
people, or to create a world without autism.  
Autism and Sociology 
An interest in Theory of Mind has risen in fields such as the social sciences and 
humanities because of its social ramifications and associated meanings of autism 
diagnoses (Marinan, 2017). In his article Greasing the Skids: Interdisciplinary Rhetoric 
and Mindblindness (2017) John Marinan examines and summarizes how ToM and 
mindblindness began as a theory in neuroscience but has since entered the rhetoric and 
taken on significance in other disciplines. Marinan notes that “given the fact that Baron-
Cohen’s research is “theory,” this has invited dialogue from other quarters to re-theorize 
the nature of autism and autistic identity” (2017, p. 579).  
Few scholars have stressed the importance of the application of sociological 
frameworks to the study of autism and yet doing so provides an additional standpoint for 
analysis (Maynard, 2017; Milton, 2013; Durig, 1993). Doug Maynard has suggested that 
sociology demonstrates how autism is embedded in social interactions (Maynard, 2016). 
In 1993, Alexander Durig first suggested that the psychological concept of Theory of 
Mind may be the “stepping-stone to a microsociological theory” of autism. Indeed, much 
of the literature attempting to challenge deficiency paradigms and address autistic 
selfhood and agency have centered on critiquing Theory of Mind.  
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 Alexander Durig (1993) developed logical inference theory and suggests that it is 
the only theory that has been able to account for all the difficulties in communication 
present in historical understandings of autism, namely those outlined by Uta Frith.  In his 
book Autism and the Crisis of Meaning (1996), Durig allegedly “shows that everyday 
meaningful perception may be organized largely by a balanced ratio of inductive to 
deductive logics, and that autistic perception is comprised of significantly higher levels of 
deductive social inferencing relative to inductive social inferencing”. Logical inference 
theory seeks to explain the logical structure of sense-making in everyday life. According 
to Durig, social interaction and inferencing is mostly an inductive process.  
 Durig contends that autistic experiences are better characterized as a 
preference/reliance on deductive logic (in particular) and that “the appearance of a lack 
of theory of mind would be a potential consequence of an individual processing 
interaction with others using deductive rather than inductive logic” (Milton, 2014, p. 5). 
For Durig, faculties of induction are deficient in autistic people noting that “all the 
subjective components necessary for the individual actor to anticipate, define, and 
interpret normative conversational interaction are inductive”. He suggests that autistic 
people can apply logic to understand meaning in interaction but cannot do this across 
situations and “therefore, they cannot experience mind, meaning, language, self, and 
emotions the way most individuals do” (Durig, 1993, p. 12). This may have substantial 
merit, however, Durig’s focus on logical processes of inferencing continues to situate 
autistic difficulties in communication as deficiencies in individual cognitive processes.  
Additional concerns with Durig’s research are that he (a) centers and assumes the 
debunked work of Bruno Bettelheim relying on Bettelheim’s conception of autistic 
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people’s lack of self and (b) the fact that his only source of data is the autobiography of 
one woman, Donna Williams. More importantly however, Durig claims that he uses a 
symbolic interactionist approach to autism, yet he suggests that symbolic interactionism 
has made a fatal flaw in understanding meaning by assuming that meaningful symbols 
are what create meaningful perception. For Durig, symbolic interactionists have it 
backwards as he argues that meaningful perception “precedes the use of meaningful 
symbols” (Cottrell, 1997). We learn how to meaningfully perceive as we learn 
meaningful symbols during the process of socialization. Symbols and their meanings can 
distort our perceptions. I posit that meaningful perception and meaningful symbols 
cannot be separated.  
In fact, Mead emphasized how society controls mental processes such that 
symbols allow us to name and categorize our perceptions. In other words, meaningful 
symbols shape our perception and we learn each simultaneously such that they cannot be 
meaningfully separated. Otherwise we would be bombarded by all our perceptions and 
unable to parse out what was meaningful. Meaningful symbols and perception are what 
allow us to categorize and evaluate the social world; that is, to use inductive, deductive, 
and abductive logic. Moreover, symbols allow us to meaningfully perceive the past and 
the future as well as the minds of others, i.e., role taking. Durig’s microsociological 
approach to autism seeks to explain the appearance of lack of ToM without critiquing its 
impact on research of autism. His approach seeks to apply his own logical inference 
theory to explain the most common features of the deficit and disability model in contrast 
to psychology theories which have so far offered only partial explanations and support of 
the deficiency paradigm. 
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Of any other scholar Milton’s criticisms of ToM and approach to autism, which 
typically are phenomenological, demonstrate what microsociological analyses have to 
offer the study of autism.  Regarding ToM, he holds it as merely “a partial heuristic 
regarded as empirical fact as Baron-Cohen suggests that intentions are observable ‘things’ 
in the mind” (Milton, 2013; McGuire & Michalko, 2009, p. 166). This view is also 
supported by McGuire and Michalko (2009) who argue that, “Rather than ‘seeing’ 
intention, we presuppose that all action, whether our own or that of others, is intentional 
and, as a way to make sense of action, we endow it with intentionality.” They point out 
that “we are never able to gain access to the minds of other. Rather we are “always on the 
way to knowing the other” (2009, p. 176). Additionally, Milton contends that, “Autism is 
a social phenomenon because it has social effects. It is named by people in the social 
world and is lived by people in the social world. Theory of Mind on the other hand 
reduces autism to a modular brain function” (Marinan, 2017, p. 578).   
The fact is that non-autistic people are also often misguided in their attempts to 
assume others’ states of mind. We only think we know and this effort is made to make 
sense of the world around us rather than the result of any innate human capacity to 
perceive other’s thoughts, motives, or intentions. No person can read the thoughts of 
others. We are all blind to the minds of others. This is an important ontological difference 
between a sociocultural approach and a psychopathological approach (Milton, 2012).  
Milton centers the critiques of ToM on their implications and positioning of 
autism as a disorder of empathy and self. He states, “It has been suggested that a theory 
of mind and empathy are essential to that which makes humans what they are. Thus, the 
characterization of autistic people lacking such abilities suggests that they are somewhat 
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less than fully human and when linked to criminality and cruelty to others brings back 
images of the ‘atavistic criminal” (Milton, 2014; Lawson, 2010). It is argued that 
depicting autistic people as ‘lacking empathy’ is an inaccurate and dangerous narrative to 
pursue. Implications of Theory of Mind include what Milton has called the myth of no 
empathy. No studies have explicitly focused on the narratives of the socialization 
experiences of autistic people or sought to validate autistic experiences of self.  
Milton (2013) takes issue with Simon Baron-Cohen’s essentialist view of ToM 
and its associated lack of empathy, arguing that autistic individuals do not lack empathy. 
Arguing that ToM rests on an inadequate assumption of the meaning of empathy, Milton 
states that, “empathy is a convenient illusion, and the phenomenon that people speak of 
when referring to it has more to do with language and a sense of ‘shared’ cultural 
meanings/ and symbols” (Milton, 2013) Relying on Garfinkel’s concept of “filling in the 
gaps,” Milton acknowledges that autistic people are often more literal, relying on 
available information rather than “filling in the gaps” with their inferences and 
interpretations of social acts that contribute to smooth social interactions. This supports 
Durig’s observation that autistic people tend to use deductive rather than inductive logic. 
However, Milton suggests a difference in stock-knowledge rather than autistic individuals 
lacking the abilities to empathize or understand their minds or those of others. He 
suggests the existence of a double empathy problem. 
 If autism produces unique cultural ways of being, it is not just that autistic 
individuals do not understand neurotypical (non-autistic) styles of communication, it is 
also that neurotypical people lack the ability to understand and empathize with autistic 
styles of communication. Relying on Garfinkel, Milton suggests that autistic differences 
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in “mindreading” are a result of their differential socialization because autistic minds 
process information and thus perceive the social order in idiosyncratic ways. Ethnos, 
according to Garfinkel, refers to the availability to an actor the common-sense knowledge 
of a society. Thus, because of differences in perception, the world makes sense in a 
different way so that “autistic individuals can be described as inhabiting a unique and 
different ethnos than neurotypical people” (2013). This parallels the research by 
Davidson that lends support to the notion that autism produces a distinct communication 
styles and cultural experience. 
  According to Dinishak and Akhtar, use of the term mindblindness “obscures the 
nature of communication, creates negative connotations, influences neurotypical 
ascriptions of autistic behavior, and blurs the line between deficit and difference” (2013, 
p. 111). Marinan describes this rhetoric as relying on metaphor, specifically language that 
implies autistics lack (2017; see also Coleman-Fountain, 2016). Maguire and Michalko 
suggest that scholars “treat autism as a teacher and thus as having something valuable to 
contribute toward and understanding of the inherent partiality and uncertainty of human 
communication and collective life” (2011, p. 162).  
Additionally, Milton calls attention to the social construction of normality and 
cultural patterns of interaction that when violated results in unsuccessful social 
interactions. The result is that autistic patterns of interaction and communication have 
been stigmatized and labeled as deviant. While it is widely acknowledged that autistic 
selves are atypical, the argument has been made that it is essentialism and rhetoric that 
classifies autistic ways of being as inherently deficient rather than (neuro)diverse.  
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From a microsociological perspective, developmental psychology and the 
concepts of ToM and mindblindness suggest that individuals on the autism spectrum 
“suffer” from an inability to “take the role of the other,” a phenomenon that is critical to 
the sociological understanding of the development of self and processes of interaction. 
However, this is not to say that ToM and role-taking are identical concepts by different 
titles. 
 Franks (2012), in his Handbook of Neurosociology suggests that the key 
difference is that role-taking positions Mead’s concept of the “act” as the unit of analysis 
which “stresses interactional processes that ToM does not necessarily do” (2012, p. 28). 
Citing a study by Thomas (1972), Franks further notes that maintaining the boundaries 
between ToM and role taking are important because role taking emphasizes interpersonal 
resources while ToM emphasizes “those stemming from one’s personal capacities.” He 
argues that this distinction is necessary because role taking is a distinctive sociological 
concept, but that ToM is useful because it can guide researchers to “the important places 
in the brain where a neurosociologist might look for correlates of role taking.” However, 
role-taking is observed in interaction.  
I posit that it is not necessary to search the physiology of the brain for “proof” of 
what has been and can be observed in interaction. Mead makes it clear that mind and self 
are social processes and this is why role taking focuses on the act. Studies of role taking 
have been researched and replicated while ToM is suggested to be both unreliable and 
difficult to replicate (Kulke et. al., 2015). Role taking nor perspective taking as concepts 
are a contested terrain while ToM is because the discourse surrounding it is linked to the 
“normalization of the psycho-emotional disablement of autistic people” (Milton, 2012).  
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As we have seen, the implications borne of ToM which render autistic people as 
less-than is largely supported by physiological and experimental psychological research. 
What differences, if any, can be seen with the application of a sociological framework 
particularly when autism is disentangled from other comorbid diagnoses? What insights 
can be gleaned by positioning autistic actors as the experts on their own experiences of 
self and interaction? 
 
Chapter Three: Symbolic Interactionism and the Self 
Both psychological social psychology and symbolic interactionism (SI) offer 
theoretical models for the development of selves. From an SI perspective, though 
genetics and biology underpin consciousness, people are not born with selves; selves are 
a product of social processes. Unlike psychological social psychology, SI is theoretically 
equipped to examine differences in development through the lens of social 
constructionism. To early sociological social psychologists, understanding self-
development was of interest as an essential component of the process of socialization and 
the relationship between individuals and society. SI holds that the self and the social 
cannot be separated. SI scholars, as a basic tenet of the perspective, take the “social act” 
rather than the self as their primary object of analysis (Hewitt, 2007; Mead, 1934). Since 
the selfhood of autistic actors has been problematized, the current study will focus on the 
experiences of self of autistic actors from their own perspectives and in their own words.  
It is interesting to highlight that both psychological social psychology and SI 
understandings of the phenomenon we call a self can be traced back to William James. 
Yet, modern psychology and neuroscience have taken a course that seeks to link our 
 
21 
experience of self to specific neuroanatomical sites and processes. This reification or 
naturalization reduces the phenomena of the self to specific regions, structures, and 
processes in the brain that deviate from a statistical norm (Kircher and David, 2003). 
Within the larger medical discourse, the focus has been on pinpointing and curing 
perceived deficits that are deemed pathological. This effort has so far been fruitless in 
terms of improving the lives of autistic people. 
In contrast, symbolic interactionism “avoids distorting our diverse human natures 
in particular and narrow caricatures, but is also one that respects and emphasizes the 
value of theoretically guided empirical inquiry as of the best hopes of humankind for 
creating a better world” (Hewitt, 2007, p. 233). However, the difference between a 
sociological social psychology approach and psychological social psychology approach 
are often confusing and difficult to grasp. This section will outline the distinctions 
between the two approaches and explain what a symbolic interactionist approach to 
autism has to offer.  
Peggy A. Thoits (1995) reminds us that we cannot expect psychologists to 
adequately explore theoretical processes that are uniquely sociological because “people’s 
thoughts and feelings and behaviors are also explained by relational dynamics or 
mechanisms such as the social construction of reality, the formation of change in 
normative expectations, the ability to take the role of the generalized other, and the 
exercise of power, prestige, and authority” (1995; p. 1240). She states that the difference 
between psychologists and sociologists is that the former looks at intervening cognitive 
mechanisms and ignores the contextual and constraints of actors while sociologists are 
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most likely to prioritize these variables which, from a sociological perspective, are 
necessary to explore key features of social psychological phenomena.  
Moreover, cognitive psychology focuses on how people store and process 
information, which has been the fashionable and most common approach to the study of 
mind giving rise to Theory of Mind that has influenced basic assumptions and lines of 
inquiry. Psychological social psychology has sought to examine the influence of others 
yet consistently overlooks important factors such as status or social standing, that is, the 
relationship of selves to others.  
On the other hand, sociological social psychologists and symbolic interactionists 
in particular “inspect the influence of specific and generalized others on the thoughts and 
feelings and behaviors of the individual—and their influence on specific others in the 
social order” (Thoits, 1995). Symbolic interactionism is able to focuses on actor’s 
structural relationship to the environment, generalized expectations and norms that 
influence how we interpret autistic actors, how autistic actors are influenced by norms, 
and “the mechanisms through which the individual and society are mutually influenced” 
(Thoits, 1995; p. 1233).  
Interestingly, psychologists have studied key symbolic interactionist processes 
such as role taking, interpersonal perceptions, impression formation and management 
more extensively and explicitly than sociologists (Thoits, 1995). For example, 
psychological social psychologists have distinguished between cognitive and empathic 
role taking and the different effects of these abilities on moral development (Thoits, 
1995; Choplan et al., 1985; Kaplan & Arbuthnot, 1985). It is much less common for 
sociologists to prioritize uniquely psychological concepts.  
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The point is that sociologists and psychologists have different methodologies and 
different agendas. For Thoits (1995) the key distinction of a psychological perspective 
from a sociological perspective in social psychology is (1) psychology’s pursuit of 
explanatory processes and (2) the lack of attention to status characteristics, role, 
relationships, and organizational or hierarchical concepts (1995, p. 1240). Therefore, 
even though social psychology is broadly characterized by an interplay between 
sociological and psychological concepts and similar topics of interest such as 
socialization and the self and identity, they illuminate different aspects of social 
phenomena. 
When it comes to socialization psychological approaches are oriented toward 
child development and moral development. This partially contributes to the over 
representation of children in studies of autism which is often not generalizable to adults. 
Sociologists studying socialization tend to focus on processes of adult socialization such 
as gender socialization, age socialization and role appropriate behavior as well as the 
sources of socialization and transitions through the life-course (Thoits, 1995). 
Psychologists focus on details of how people learn. Sociologists focus on what they learn, 
i.e., what norms are learned and from whom (Thoits, 1995; Hochschild, 1983).  
When it comes to the self and identity, psychologists typically focus on cognitive 
self-related processes, self-enhancement, and self-consistency. The use of brain imaging 
and experimental conditions reflects the “cognitive thrust” of the psychological discipline 
in general. In contrast, symbolic interactionists view the self as a social process and 
assume that enhancement and consistency are natural parts of human behavior (Thoits, 
1995). This shifts their focus to the influences of social contexts and their effect on the 
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contents of the self such as self-efficacy and self-esteem and how selves and identities 
function in interaction (Thoits, 1995). 
To summarize, we have seen that psychological studies of autistic selfhood have 
led to conclusions of impairments and deficiencies that often contradict each other as 
well as other studies in different disciplines, but most importantly the experiences of 
autistic people. From a symbolic interactionist perspective, it may be possible to refute 
contested psychological notions of the nature of autism and autistic experiences. More 
important, a distinctly symbolic interactionist perspective is equipped to prioritize both 
social context and autistic experiences of self and how actors interpret the social world. 
This contrasts with psychological approaches which positions experts who interpret 
autistic experiences. 
To frame a symbolic interactionist view of what a self is, how selves develop, 
what it means to have a self, and how our mind and self shapes interaction, discussing 
several concepts developed by William James, Charles Horton Cooley, George Herbert 
Mead, and Erving Goffman is necessary.  
Autism and the Self: A Sociological Application 
The “I” and the “Me” 
We often think of the self as something inherent in the individual. Many people 
understand the “self” as an immutable core component of a person that is relatively 
stable. Symbolic Interactionism offers a distinct view of the self as a process that actors 
create and recreate through verbal and nonverbal interaction. William James first 
articulated the conceptualization of the self as consisting of two parts, the “I” and the 
“Me.” The “I” facet of the self-process is the self as subject. The “I” is that which 
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interacts with our environment and others and responds to stimuli and situations. The 
“Me” is the facet of the self-process that is the self as object. We can imagine ourselves in 
interaction and, during thought and introspection, interact with our self. What we call the 
self is the process of the “I” and “Me” not as entities, but as states of consciousness that 
allow us to control our conduct (Hewitt, 1976).  
 For Mead, the mechanism for the development of self is reflexivity. We can take 
ourselves as an object and then evaluate ourselves—we respond to and act on ourselves 
like we do any other object. Mead demarcates his theory from other psychological 
conceptualizations of the self by embedding it in our social experiences and processes. It 
is important to point out that various sociological and postmodern scholars have argued 
that there is no self at all and that no one has a self (see Immergut, 2014 for a sociology of 
no self); yet, that is beyond the scope of the present discussion.  Interestingly however, 
Mead did assert that no person can ever experience themselves directly—we are always 
without exception viewing ourselves from the perspective of other.  
Beyond the process of the mind and self, Mead saw the “I” specifically as related 
to the larger social world in four important ways (Ritzer & Stepinsky, 2014): 
1. The “I” is the source of novelty in social processes 
2. The “I” is key to understanding our most important values 
3. The “I” permits us to develop individual personalities 
4. Mead saw an evolutionary process in history in which primitive societies are 
dominated more by the “me” while in modern societies there is a greater 
component of the “I” 
Without the “I” component in the self-process actors would be completely 
dominated by external social controls. The concept of the “I” permits us to examine the 
role of agency in social change, both by individuals in their daily lives as well the larger 
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changes brought about by important historical figures. Could it be said that autistic 
people are more influenced by the “I” than the “Me”? 
Mead believed that our own biographies and personalities shaped the relationship 
between each individual’s “I” and “Me” such that each person is a unique mix of both 
components where one never really dominates the other but at the same time are not 
equal in influence. The generalized other is housed within the “Me” and Mead 
characterized it as “conventional and habitual” (1962, p. 197). He believed that while all 
people must balance conformity and individuality, conformists are dominated by the 
“Me” and that it is through the “Me” that society dominates the individual. In fact, Mead 
defined social control as the dominance of expression of the “Me” over the “I” (Ritzer & 
Stepinsky, 2014). Mead added that some institutions are designed to stamp out 
individuality. He cited the church. In the case of autistic actors it is all the institutions 
within society that attempt to stamp out autistic ways of being, particularly the medical 
and psychological communities who, through Applied Behavioral Analysis (Lovaas, 
1965) attempt to force autistic people to conform to neurotypical sociality or else live a 
stigmatized life.  
The Looking-Glass Self 
 Unlike psychological social psychological theories of self-development, 
symbolic interactionism views the self as a process that develops through interaction 
rather than as a result of physical maturation. If we are not born with selves and they are 
not biologically triggered at a particular developmental stage what is the process that 
produces selves? To answer this question Charles Horton Cooley developed the concept 
of the looking-glass self (1902).  
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For Cooley, children develop a sense of self through their interactions with adults 
and peers. He believed that through a three-step process we each learn to imagine 
ourselves as we believe others see us. The first step in the process is the phase where we 
imagine how we appear to others. The second step in the process is when we imagine 
how they would judge us. The final phase of the looking-glass process is when we feel 
some sort of feeling or emotion based on these imagined judgements.  
For example, if we reflect on ourselves and believe that others would view us as 
unkempt, we may feel shame. Likewise, if we imagine that someone viewing us speaking 
in the front of the class as competent and prepared we are likely to feel feelings of pride. 
Cooley’s looking-glass theory posits how actors perceptions of parents and others 
reactions to them can shape our sense of self based on what the actors believe they think. 
Cooley also points out that there is no self without others—that we all come to know our 
selves through the reflections found in interaction. This theory highlights how society 
shapes how we see ourselves and how actors desire to influence the way they are seen by 
society.  
Previous research by Cage, Bird, and Pellicano (2016) used semi-structured 
interviews to explore the degree to which autistic adolescents are concerned about how 
others view them, i.e., their reputation. Their results revealed that participants were 
concerned with their reputations however, many reported that they were not interested in 
being “cool,” struggled to understand the so-called rules of being “cool,” and preferred to 
be authentic or “true to themselves.” Their study also collected information from select 
school staff who could confirm information about the students’ friendships and their 
reputations. School staff confirmed that autistic students are attuned to what others think 
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of them, are concerned with what others think of them, and are aware of and attempt to 
control their reputations (Cage, Bird, Pellicano, 2016). Some students expressed the 
knowledge that they were “different’’ and that they wished to have these differences 
accepted—that is, they wanted a reputation acknowledged as different.  
Little if any research has solely focused on autistic self-perceptions, a gap which 
the present study seeks to fill. However, some research has shown that autistics are 
concerned about forming and maintaining friendships. Of note, this contrasts with the 
dominant view of autistics as inherently antisocial. Milton contends that, contrary to 
medical discourse and public opinion, autistic individuals are interested in and do desire 
friendships and intimacy but may lack the skills to develop social bonds (also see 
Bauminger, Cory, and Agam, 2003.) For example, Sebastian, Blakemore, and Charman 
(2001) concluded that autistic individuals are sensitive to and affected by social rejection 
resulting in low self-esteem and anxiety that further complicate and negatively affect future 
social interaction. This and similar studies suggest that autistic individuals do experience 
the looking-glass self. They are sensitive to the real and imagined opinions of others and 
do takes steps to adjust their behavior in hopes of social inclusion and success. Furthermore, 
comments from respondents in the Cage, Bird, and Pellicano study who wished to be seen 
as their authentic self lends credibility to the contention that autistic people have an internal 
sense of self that they know differs and is valued differently from the perspective of others. 
This particular point was also demonstrated by Coleman-Fountain (2017) in his study 
where autistic actors described themselves as “faulty” and sought different strategies to 




George Herbert Mead outlined what would become the symbolic interactionist 
theory of self-development as a cognitive and social process that most all people progress 
through in early childhood (Mead, 1934). His theory involves the passage through three 
stages (preparatory, play, and game stages), which culminates with the development of 
the generalized other.  
During the preparatory stage children cannot distinguish self and other. Their 
experience of self is limited to imitating the behaviors of others. The play stage is marked 
by the learning of the ability to take the role of specific, real or imagined others and 
acting as they would act. Children may imitate a parent shaving, a parent cooking, or a 
sibling talking on the phone. They also engage in fantasy play and pretend to be queens, 
astronauts, or ship captains.  
At this stage, children can only play a single role at a time (Mead, 1934). Often 
children switch roles— they are unpredictable, inconsistent, and unorganized. Mead 
believed that play is how actors learn to indicate to themselves and respond as others 
would. As children gain experience through play, their interactions became more complex 
and eventually they take on multiple perspectives. This is how actors gain a sense of a 
self.  
The game stage involves learning to take ourselves as an object and viewing 
ourselves from the perspective of others. Games differ from play in that games are 
regulated by several rules and the actor must consider multiple expectations and 
perspectives of others. This is a skill. Mead called it “advanced role taking capacity.” 
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Taking the role of several others leads to the development of the generalized other—or 
the perspectives and expectations of a network of others or the community as a whole.  
Role taking involves the ability of assuming the perspective of others. When 
children can assume the perspective of others their awareness has increased and they are 
now able to consider and take into account the roles of others. Not to be confused with 
Theory of Mind, role taking is not about understanding individual states of mind but 
rather the actions and behaviors associated with the given role an individual occupies at a 
given time. Eventually children internalize these roles and begin to understand the sets of 
standards accompanying the culture in which they are socialized. They begin to take the 
perspective of the generalized other. This enables them to evaluate their own behavior 
according to these standards as well as to predict the behaviors of others.  
Norman K. Denzin (1971) and Tomatsu Shibutani (1962) expanded upon Mead’s 
theory of socialization in two important ways. First, Denzin emphasized that Mead 
intended no age sequence of the play and game stages. Some people may never progress 
to the stage of the generalized other. For Denzin, the self-development of children was 
dependent upon their “interactional age” which is linked to their interaction experiences. 
Shibutani points out that we do not simply internalize every perspective and detailed 
expectation of our culture such that actors possess a single, stable generalized other. The 
perspectives and expectations that we consider, according to Shibutani, are entirely 
contextual. Throughout the process of socialization we internalize many different 
reference groups and dependent on the situation, actors reflect on themselves according 
to the standards of a certain group.  
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In their study Specificity, contexts, and reference groups matter when assessing 
autistic traits Gernsbacher and colleagues concluded that “autistic participants are well 
equipped not only to self-report on their own traits, but also to self-report on their traits in 
different contexts and to self-report on how others view their traits” (Gernsbacher, 
Stevenson, & Dern 2017, p. 24) 
Their research “join(s) other bodies of empirical evidence that argue against the popular, 
but empirically weak, assumption that autistic people lack a theory of mind.” Moreover 
their data illustrates that both “autistic and non-autistic people’s difficulty in interaction 
and communicating is contextually specific as both groups reported easier interaction 
with their in-group.” They note that their research has important implications for 
accurately assessing traits and for designing environments that enable successful 
interaction and communication.” (2017, p. 25). 
Socialization and Self-Presentation  
Goffman saw the self as a performed character—a representation, not an organic 
thing. He believed that the self “arises diffusely from a scene that is presented” and notes 
that “the crucial concern is whether it will be credited or discredited.” For Goffman, 
authenticity is rooted fundamentally in how we act and how others respond to those 
actions as “having others think well of us means they will respond to us positively, 
defining us as worthwhile, appropriate, and desirable social actors.” It also means they 
will be more likely to accept our projected definition of the situation and to “support our 
involvement in a variety of desired activities thus enhancing our social power and 
personal freedom.”  
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As previously mentioned, Yergeau has explicitly illustrated how rhetoric and 
discourse surrounding autism discredits individuals on the spectrum in interactions with 
non-autistic people, in her case, resulting in hospitalization against her will. Her social 
position as an autistic person made her communication problematic and her perspective 
untrustworthy, which denied her personhood in interaction. Denzin points out this same 
issue when children, the mentally ill, and the elderly are examined (1978, p. 60). In 
Goffmanian terms, discredited.  
Goffman emphasizes that we implicitly and explicitly announce our identities in a 
situation through our expressive behavior, costumes, and props. Goffman proposed that 
these aspects (setting, appearance, manner) give others useful clues about who we are, 
what role we are likely to play in a situation, and how they “should define and respond to 
us.” For example, in the biographic film of Temple Grandin, Ms. Grandin arrives on her 
aunt’s farm and mentally takes note of a man. His boots, belt-buckle, hat, spurs, and 
chaps are signals to her of the individual’s identity. She exclaims, “Are you a cowboy!” 
She is scoffed at by others present and her aunt quickly corrects her and changes the 
subject, implying that Temple has made a social faux pas. Why is this man not cowboy? 
To Goffman and to Grandin, all the signs and symbols were there, and Grandin made a 
logical conclusion yet was still regarded as a problematic actor. 
It is also possible to examine how autistic actors present themselves. Scheeren 
and colleagues (2010) compared the self-presentation abilities of children and adolescents 
with Autism Spectrum Disorder to those of neurotypical children in real and hypothetical 
social contexts. In their study participants were asked to introduce themselves (without 
incentive) to the interviewer. This served as the baseline. For the real self-promotion task, 
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participants were motivated with a prize incentive. For this task the interview told 
participants, “A couple of children who participate in this study can enter a game where 
you can win lots of cool prizes. To determine who should be picked for this game with 
the prizes, I ask everyone to tell me something about him/herself” (2010, p. 651). To 
determine motivation each participant was asked to rate “how much fun” they thought the 
game would be on a 5-point scale. For the hypothetical self-promotion task, interviewers 
gave respondents the following vignette: “Imagine that you have new neighbors. You 
have heard that your new neighbors are looking for someone to do small chores in and 
around the house and they are willing to pay a lot of money for it. You can think of lots of 
nice things to spend that money on. Now you meet your neighbor for the first time and 
he/she introduces him/herself to you. What would you tell him/herself about yourself” 
(2010, p. 652). 
 The results demonstrate that participants with and without ASD increased their 
positive self-statements when they were motivated by a prize in the real task or a 
job/money in the hypothetical vignette. Importantly they note, “we did not find uniform 
support for a reduced strategic self-presentation in ASD.” Children with ASD (6-12 
years) equally expressed strategic self-statements during self-promoting as their typically 
developing peers both in real and hypothetical social contexts. (2010, p. 655). Moreover, 
“after controlling for verbal IQ differences children with ASD showed a tendency to be 
even more strategic than the typically developing group in the real social context” (2010, 
p. 655). Lastly, the study found that symptom severity, or the functioning labels of ‘high’ 
or ‘low’, “was not significantly correlated with strategic self-statements during self-
promotion” (2010, p. 655). This study suggests that not only are autistic individuals able 
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to calculate a self-presentation sensitive to setting, appearance, and manner but 
sometimes can present themselves in a way that is more successful in promoting a 
favorable, i.e., an image of their self-credited in interaction that is responded to positively 
by others. In sum, studies such as this demonstrate that alternative theories beyond 
Theory of Mind, which immediately discredits autistic actors, are needed to fully 
understand autistic self and interaction.  
When social selves are stigmatized, such as the case of disability, this may 
become the primary identifying characteristic, or what Hughes (1963) deemed a master 
status. Similarly, Goffman notes, “The lifelong attributes of a particular individual may 
cause him to be typecast; he may have to play the stigmatized role in almost all of his 
social situations, making it natural to refer to him, as I have done, as a stigmatized person 
whose life-situation places him in opposition to normal” (1963, p. 138). 
An autistic person’s self-perception, self-concept, and self-presentation are all 
autistic because autism cannot be disentangled from their physical body and social 
identity—the self in the situation is autism embodied and thus, influences their own 
perceptions of themselves and any interaction in which they engage. Due to the nature of 
autism and the stigmatization of autistic sociality, most, if not all non-autistic people view 
autistic people in terms of social deficits. The result is that fewer people allow themselves 
to recognize the individual within the diagnosis to acknowledge their humanity and 
personhood. Symbolic interactionism highlights how non-autistic people see a 
stigmatized person as opposed to someone with an alternate communicative, 
interactional, or perceptual style.  
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Stigma management is described by Goffman as “an offshoot of something basic 
in society, the stereotyping of ‘profiling’ of our normative expectations regarding conduct 
and character” (Goffman, 1963, p.51). He saw stigma management as a continuum 
between public life and interpersonal relationships. This view allows us to see that when 
autism is understood as a disease and something that should be eradicated this 
discursively renders autistic people as something less than human. Social differences are 
not to be accommodated but corrected or removed from the social world, which over the 
past has led to institutionalization and violence against autistic bodies and spirits by 
doctors, educators, parents and parents through the search for a cure and the application 
of Applied Behavioral Analysis. 
To Goffman (1963, p. 103-104) a stigma is “anything which interferes directly 
with the etiquette of mechanics of communication obtrudes itself constantly into the 
interaction and is difficult to disattend genuinely.” Thus, stigmatized individuals “may 
have to learn about the structure of the interaction in order to learn the lines along which 
they must reconstitute their conduct if they are to minimize the obtrusiveness of their 
stigma.” Important to microsociology, he goes on to say that “one can learn about the 
features of interaction that might otherwise be too much taken for granted to be noted” 
which parallels the angle of other scholars undertaking a microsociological approach to 
autism studies beyond advocacy research (see Maynard). This further demonstrates the 
value of a sociological approach to the study of autism. 
Moreover, Tyler (2018) describes how research on stigma “often side-lines 
questions about where stigma is produced, by whom and for what purposes” and ignores 
the political and social aspects of stigma, namely “how stigma is used by individuals, 
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communities and the state to produce and reproduce social inequality” (Tyler, 2018; 
Parker & Aggleton, 2008). Tyler notes that a major concern is “rethinking stigma as a 
‘bureaucratized form of violence” (Tyler, 2018; Cooper & Whyte, 2017, p. 3). For Tyler, 
one of the central aims in rethinking stigma is to center class and race within the study of 
stigmatization to see it as a “classificatory form of power.” The present study seeks to 
extend this rethinking of stigma to neurodiverse peoples as a cultural community subject 
to similar functions of power and control.  
Similar to stigmas surrounding mental illness, efforts to reduce stigma by 
emphasizing the biological over the social and cultural “veils over a whole host of more 
fundamental, cultural, political and economic questions regarding the distribution of 
distress” as it paints autism as beyond one’s control (Tyler, 2018; Davies, 2017; Davies, 
2016). When it comes to the prevalence of “success stories,” both in the public discourse 
of mental illnesses such as depression and here extended to the stories of autistic people, 
Tyler points out that individualized stories “airbrush out” important sociological 
questions about the causes of distress. To clarify, mental illnesses such as depression and 
anxiety can be linked to larger social forces. In the same way, autism is named in the 
social world and constitutes “arbitrary lines drawn in the sand between what constitutes 
normality and psychiatric (or indeed neurological) deviance” (Milton, 2014, p. 3).  
Aside from any individual cognitive difficulties in inferencing and social 
interaction, autistic people find themselves functioning as stigmatized individuals “unsure 
of the reception waiting them in face-to-face interaction” where they are subjected to 
evaluations based on what Goffman referred to as a “virtual middle class ideal.” Goffman 
notes that “when we interact with strangers or intimates, we will find that the fingertips of 
 
37 
society have reached bluntly into contact, ever here putting us in our place.” 
Neurodiverse people such as ASDs and ADHDs communicate and perceive the world 
differently and therefore interact with the world differently as a result.  
Autistic ways of communication are routinely described as “odd” or “bizarre” and 
therefore stigmatized. Any deviance from norms of perception is stigmatized. More 
succinctly, autistic people are often misunderstood whether or not they are actively 
engaging in stigma management—a double-edged sword. Autistic ways of 
communication with others and the physical world have been perceived by police as 
mentally ill to the point of arrest and even death. Goffman notes that stigmatized actors 
“effort(s) to conceal may cause him to display other ones or give the appearance of doing 
so: slovenliness, inattentiveness, stubbornness, woodenness, or distance, sleepiness seen 
as day dreaming, drunkenness (1963, p. 85).  Different ways of communicating can be 
perceived as uncouth, uncivilized, “lying,” “not making sense” or “mental illness,” 
“egocentrism,” or as suggested by Theory of Mind “lacking empathy.” 
Sticky Situations: The Autistic Self in Interaction 
The social world for autistic people is dominated by non-autistics in their home, 
school, and workplace. Only in extremely rare events are autistic actors ever in the sole 
company of other autistic people. The neurotypical perception is that autistic people are 
unable or impaired in their abilities of social bonding as demonstrated in the discourse 
surrounding autism (Sinclair, 2010; Coleman-Fountain, 2017). Due to the assumptions 
and contributions of ToM, people labeled autistic are discursively rendered mindblind and 
thought of as having ‘faulty’ neurological and cognitive functions that result in supposed 
reductions of emotional capacities and empathy.  
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Coleman-Fountain highlights that rhetoric such as “alone,” “living in their own 
worlds,” and “trapped inside a shell” are each spatial metaphors that reinforce a distance 
from “normal and ordinary” and “invoke notions of autistic separateness” (2017, p. 9). 
Coleman-Fountain (2017) drew upon Scully’s (2010) metaphor of stickiness in 
interaction to reframe autistic sociality as having a property of inequality. He likens this 
concept to Milton’s double empathy problem and discusses how the responsibility to 
manage interactions is placed on autistic actors to pass as neurotypical. Coleman-
Fountain notes that Scully’s metaphor “illuminates autistic people’s efforts to avoid 
discomfort in interaction” (2017, p.9; McLaughlin, 2017) and his study examined the 
management of negative responses in autistic and non-autistic social encounters using the 
metaphor of stickiness to “acknowledge (autistic) sociality, non-autistic social power, and 
the relationality of social ‘dysfunction’” (2017, p. 9).  
His results demonstrated that autistic actors often described social discomfort as 
“awkward” which they considered a typical and pervasive facet of interaction. Many 
respondents in Coleman-Fountain’s study described feeling embarrassed or awkward 
when social communication “broke down,” feeling nervous, and lacking confidence in 
interaction particularly with new people.  
Unlike embarrassment resulting from the breakdown in communication between 
non-autistic actors, for the respondents, these feelings were attributed to being autistic by 
both autistic individuals and non-autistic people—that is to say “autism directly 
contributed to awkward encounters” by undermining their success in interaction (2017, p. 
13). Coleman-Fountain discovered the following themes when respondents discussed 
their encounters with non-autistic people: misunderstandings, failure of non-autistic 
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people to try to understand their point view and being made to feel ‘weird’—each of 
which suggest a power imbalance. However, power imbalances occur frequently in 
encounters between non-autistic actors since power is a facet of all interaction (Hocker & 
Burton, 1985).  
Importantly, Coleman-Fountain describes how autistic young adults do often see 
themselves as “faulty.” He examined their attempts to manage difficulty in interaction by 
attempting to improve their communication skills to avoid being perceived as “weird” 
(Coleman-Fountain, 2017, p. 14; Brownlow, 2010). In many ways the strategies used 
parallel the efforts of non-autistic actors to reduce or avoid social discomfort. One way of 
doing this was to avoid places or seek out alternative spaces where they could be more 
comfortable—in other words, to isolate themselves. Other methods included bringing a 
friend along, reading books on social interaction to improve their own communication 
skills, self-monitoring during interaction, and reflecting on what worked in the past and 
what resulted in unsuccessful interaction. He points out two key facts: (a) autistic people 
seek to adapt to the social world, not adapt the social world and (b) this is form of hidden 
labor (see also Scully, 2010) to reduce social discomfort, feelings of failure, negative 
judgements, and misunderstandings that have the potential to disrupt autistic actors’ daily 
lives.  
Additionally, Coleman-Fountain suggests that autistic actors were accustomed to 
and expected stickiness in their encounters with non-autistic people. They anticipated 
unease because they routinely felt scrutinized and judged during interaction. These fears 
of failure and judgement fed into their self-monitoring and heightened their concerns for 
sociality, which they all considered important to their life but struggled to develop or 
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succeed at. Therefore, it is crucial to acknowledge the inequality in autistic and non-
autistic interaction and explore how we can emphasize autistic differences in sociality 
and disposition to reduce the likelihood of sticky encounters rather than leave the onus of 
self-improvement on autistic actors. Coleman-Fountain suggests that this can be done by 
“finding ways in which non-autistic people can learn about autistic peoples need for 
recognition, comfort and care which non-autistic and autistic encounters can deny” 
(2017, p. 15). From a methodological perspective this means that we must center first-







Chapter Four: Methods 
Intended Study 
Most psychological social psychology and neurological theories and research of 
the self and its development center on a model of a deficit and disability and have 
focused on autism as a “disorder of self and understanding” (Zahavi, 2010, p. 547). There 
has been a reluctance to include autistic voices in research and little effort has been made 
by researchers to consider the autistic perspectives of self and interaction. This study 
seeks to illustrate how symbolic interactionism can provide an alternate framework to 
pragmatically, as opposed to clinically, evaluate autistic experiences. The aim is to point 
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out that from a symbolic interactionist perspective autistic people have a self as opposed 
to Theory of Mind which suggests critical impairments hinder the development of self. 
Participants 
IRB approval was obtained from Western Kentucky University. Purposive 
sampling was utilized to collect data from individuals who have been identified as 
autistic and can verbalize their perspectives. Permission was obtained from the directors 
of two student resource centers for students diagnosed along the autism spectrum at a 
state university to distribute a flyer requesting volunteers. Five of the twelves respondents 
in this study were recruited through the university. Initially the paper flyer was tacked 
onto various, presumably high-traffic spots on campus. After several months the director 
of one of the student resources was contacted and determined that providing the 
researcher with the opportunity to inform students entering and exiting the center about 
the study and invite them to volunteer. The remaining seven respondents replied to a 
digital copy of the flyer that was shared on three different social media sites from the 
researcher’s personal accounts. The flyer was available online for four months prior to 
the end of data collection and is currently still available. It is impossible to determine 
how many people saw the flyer online. Fourteen people contacted the researcher and 
expressed interest but ultimately did not participate due to scheduling conflicts or reasons 
not disclosed to the researcher. To meet the criteria volunteers were required to be over 
the age of 18, a current or former university student, and must have sought a diagnosis or 
been diagnosed with an Autism Spectrum Disorder by a licensed clinical professional. All 
participants were asked to read and sign a consent form, included as APPENDIX A. 
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Participants were invited to participate in a review of the write-up; all participants 
declined this opportunity. 
Data Collection 
This study collected data from 12 adults on the autism spectrum through 
individual in-depth qualitative interviews. Interview questions were open-ended and 
focused on aspects of social life including experiences in institutions such as the family 
and school, as well as, agents of socialization including friendships, play, and various 
forms of media. All face-to-face interviews were audio recorded with participant consent 
and transcribed verbatim. The average length of interview conducted in person or video 
was approximately 1.5 hours. Interviews conducted via chat or email were digitally 
logged. The transcripts from these interviews provide the raw data for this study.  
Instrument 
Interview questions were developed to assess autistic perceptions of self and 
experiences associated with socialization. Symbolic interactionism holds that selves 
develop through interaction. A classic instrument used to evaluate the self was Manford 
Kuhn and the Iowa School’s Twenty Statements Test (TST). This test was later simplified 
(McPhail and Tucker, 1972) by asking the single question “What should I say about you? 
If someone asked me who you were, what would you want me to say?” This is the first 
interview question in the present study. The adaptation was selected due to its 
conversational nature in lieu of the standardized assessment format of the traditional TST.  
Subsequent questions were designed to elicit narrative data about socialization 
experiences and perceptions of self and others such as parents, educators, friends, and 
community members. College students were chosen because they could talk about their 
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experiences in public education as well as the transition to college and adulthood thus, 
the sample was limited by class and education. Respondents were asked to reflect and 
recount “important events that they would never forget” from their life. This line of 
inquiry was framed to recall events from early childhood (“Who took care of you when 
you were young?” and “What are your first or earliest memories?”), elementary school, 
middle school, high school, transition to college and adulthood, and hopes for the future 
(“Where do you see yourself in five years”), and what they wish non-autistic knew about 
autistic people. This allowed me to examine autobiographical life-course accounts of 
current and former college students who identify as autistic. Other purposeful interview 
questions include an important turning point in the moral career of an autistic person, the 
experience of diagnosis. The guide is included as APPENDIX B.  
Analysis 
Symbolic Interactionists have long advocated a naturalist strategy to the study 
socialization; researchers collect behavior specimens (Barker, 1968) to reproduce the 
experiences, thoughts, and language of those under study. By reproducing these 
experiences, a rich array of data can be analyzed to determine what forces individuals see 
as influencing and shaping their behavior (Denzin, 1977). A qualitative, inductive 
approach is purely data driven. The researcher investigates emergent patterns in the data, 
which in this study are the interview transcripts. Limiting the study to the exploration of 
how social experiences and self are perceived by autistic persons positions the respondent 
as the expert on their own experiences. This is important, as we have seen that autistic 
voices have been misrepresented in the literature.   
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Analysis of data utilized Smith, Flower, and Larkin’s (2009) method of 
Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). Interpretivism is an epistemological 
position that requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social action 
(Bryman, 2012). IPA is a phenomenologically focused approach that collects “detailed, 
reflective, first-person” accounts from respondents (Larkin & Thompson, 2012).  IPA 
requires open research questions and does not test hypotheses or build theory; it is used to 
“open up a dialogue with extant theory” while engaging with theoretically informed 
questions.  
IPA has previously been used to examine how autistic individuals made sense of 
their diagnosis and thus, diagnostic label (Macleod, Lewis, & Robertson, 2013).  
Therefore, it is well suited to extensive interviews while positioning the respondent as the 
expert on their own experiences. This is important, as we have seen that autistic voices 
have been excluded from knowledge production in clinical and theoretical interpretations 
of autism (Milton, 2014).   
Symbolic interactionism does not currently provide enough information to fully 
explicate how perceptual and communication differences may alter socialization, leading 
to differential paths or processes of self-development in terms of autism compared to 
neurotypical development. However, symbolic interactionism holds that individual’s self-
development is unique based on culture, personal biography, and the intersections of race, 
class, and gender. If we add autistic perception as another facet impacting experience, it 
is only through qualitative analyses such as autobiographical accounts of autistic actors or 
ethnomethodology and phenomenology that non-autistic people can begin to understand 
the interactional impact of neurodiversity from an autistic standpoint. A qualitative 
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interpretative analysis fits this study as it allows us to begin to formulate a new area of 
SI—a microsociological theory of autism. This may broaden SI theories of self-
development, socialization, stigmatization, and interaction so that they are applicable to 
neurodiverse perceptions and ways of being.  
Glaser and Strauss (1967, p. 255) note that it is important not to simply elaborate 
on an existing theory because this often leads to the suppressing of “rich data as well as 
potentially rich insights that could transcend the theory.” Because SI is based on the 
perception and experiences of non-autistic individuals, a study of autistic self and 
socialization experiences should qualify the theoretical foundation of symbolic 
interactionism by pinpointing differences between non-autistic and autistic sociality. 
Simultaneously, it should support the theory by underlining similarities between non-
autistic and autistic experiences of sociality, socialization, and self.  
Analysis of data will specifically relied on symbolic interactionist themes and 
theories of self-development as it is the dominant perspective toward the self in 
sociology. Analysis included two types of coding, substantive and theoretical. According 
to Glaser (1978, p. 165) substantive codes fracture the data into bits and pieces while 
theoretical coding integrates the substantive coding to “weave the fractured story back 
together again [into] an organized whole theory” (1978, p. 165). Substantive coding 
determined the general category that an item represents. Theoretical coding specifically 
relied on linking sociological themes and theories of self and interaction to the illustrative 




Chapter Five: Findings 
Most people have an “underlying sense of who you are—a sense that does not 
change dramatically from one situation to the next” but this is merely a sense. Our 
understandings of any ‘real’ or ‘essential’ self is (a) grounded in and confirmed by social 
experiences with others in a comfortable and seemingly natural way, and (b) social 
experiences that do not make you feel comfortable or genuine (Denzin, 1978). Due to 
neurological differences in perception and communication autistic ways of being  
complicate interaction and autistic social experiences are often described as lacking and 
unsuccessful. Thus, autistic selves are confirmed in interaction as strange, unusual, and 
ultimately stigmatized (Milton, 2013; Macleod, Lewis, & Roberts, 2012). The focus has 
been on what is “wrong” with autistic people and how autistic ways of being can be 
stopped or “normalized.”  
Symbolic interactionism was chosen as the theoretical orientation for this study 
because  (a) autistic differences in social perception and communication are characteristic 
of and problematized in the predominant literature and (b) sociology’s dominant 
theoretical approach to the self and interaction even beyond the branch of social 
psychology. The foundation of Symbolic Interactionism (SI) is pragmatism which 
provides the framework of viewing phenomena in terms of what is occurring in 
interaction rather than biological, neurological differences or deficits. This shift allows us 
to focus on how autistic people navigate the social world, not their individual cognitive 
deficits.  
The central aim of this study was to analyze autistic self-perceptions and 
socialization experiences by collecting autobiographical accounts through in-depth 
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interviews. The purpose was to compare the explanatory power of symbolic 
interactionism to the dominant psychological literature. The narratives told by 
respondents provided many examples of self-processes critical to SI theories of self-
development, socialization, and interaction. Respondents provided descriptions of self-
concepts, anecdotes of socialization and social experiences, and articulated their 
biographical selves in the sense that respondents indicated an awareness of the link 
between their past, current, and future selves. The themes included in this study address 
basic sociological concepts critical to the development and presentation of self and the 
socialization experiences of people on the autism spectrum as well as their relationships 
to others. First, I discuss how the findings demonstrate that a sociological approach to 
autism is both (a) appropriate to the data collected in the current study and (b) supported 
by other research aimed at explicating the experiences of autistic actors.  
Autism and the Self: A Sociological Approach 
The “I” and the “Me” 
Psychological social psychologists and symbolic interactionists agree that 
pronoun use is indicative of self-processes. This section will briefly describe the “I” and 
“Me” concepts emergent in one respondent’s speech. Brevity is justified and appropriate 
because the reflexive relationship of taking one’s self as both subject and object is 
apparent in most conversation and in all excerpts from the interviews in the current study. 
This may be largely due to the fact that the respondents were specifically asked to reflect 
on their experiences and to describe their “self.”  Moreover, concepts in symbolic 
interactionism, particularly the reflexive self process and the Looking Glass Self, are not 
easily disentangled, especially in conversation. This is because they are co-occurring 
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phenomena which cannot be neatly separated. For example, the Looking Glass Self can 
be generally understood as our self-perceptions being an internalization of how others see 
us. The key difference in abstracting the self as the dialectical relationship of the “I’’ and 
the “Me” from the Looking Glass Self is that the latter can be observed through feelings 
of pride or mortification and potential adjustments of behavior which will be discussed in 
the following section. 
 If Theory of Mind posits that cognitive faculties prevent the ability to “read” the 
minds of others, thus critically impairing the development of empathy or self, then from a 
symbolic interactionist perspective autistic actors would not demonstrate the “Me” -- that 
is, must be unable to take themselves as an object and to reflect on themselves. According 
to symbolic interactionism pronoun usage demonstrates the reflexive self process in the 
use of language.  
The respondents in this study frequently used pronomial language and there were 
no instances in the twelve in-depth interviews that the respondents mixed-up the use of 
“I,” “Me” or other terms such as “you,” “we,” “he,” or “she.”  If symbolic interactionists 
see the self as a conversation between the “I” and “Me,” components which can be 
observed when actors use language, that is, actors speaking of themselves as the subject 
and at other times taking themselves as an object which together constitute the self, then 
theoretically this should be, and indeed was, reflected in their descriptions of themselves 
and their experiences. Take for example Benjamin describing his relationship with a close 
friend:  
 
I suspected that he was a lot like me is some regards. That’s why I was drawn to 
him. I think that’s kind of why we were drawn to each other. We were both kind 
of the social outcasts. But we were fellow outcasts. 
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       (Benjamin,) 
 
Here Benjamin demonstrates the “I” because he is recounting his own impulsive 
actions of “suspecting” and “being drawn to” someone after the initial act. When he states 
that “We were both kind of the social outcasts” he is demonstrating the “Me.” The use of 
the term “social outcasts” reflects the generalized other. Benjamin is recalling an 
experience and then framing himself and his friend from the view of larger society. He 
was only able to understand why he was “drawn to” his friend by reflecting on his own 
actions and he is only able to interpret the commonality between he and his friend 
through the “Me,” that is, considering their social positions as fellow outcasts. It is the 
aspect of the “Me” that allows Benjamin to align his own social position with that of his 
friend.  
Since Kanner’s earliest writings on autism in the 1940’s atypical or incorrect 
pronoun usage has been characteristic of the speech and communication of specifically 
autistic children. It is important to note that all children are still learning to use language 
and that irregular pronoun use may be more typical of children or a particular 
developmental stage rather than autism. Several recent studies have explored pronoun 
usage in terms of autistic selfhood. Shield and colleagues study of communication of 
children who are exposed to American Sign Language and autistic found that the children 
were more likely to sign their own names in place of personal pronouns. Those with more 
developed sign language produced more pronouns.  They suggest that even though 
individual names are longer to sign compared to signing “me” by pointing to one’s chest 
all children did point spontaneously however, “It could well be that the differences we 
observe in language reflect not so much different experiences of selfhood but different 
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attitudes toward the perceived precision of linguistic forms.” Shield and colleagues 
suggest that signing one’s name or the name of another may seem more logical since 
names are consistently specific whereas whom the pronoun refers to varies according to 
the speaker/signer.  
Similarly, Geoff Bird notes that whether abnormalities in pronoun usage reflects a 
“difference in a sense of self or just in the way individuals with autism use language to 
refer to the self is harder to determine” (Bird, 2010). Additionally, Bird and colleagues 
are currently researching the comorbidity and difference between autism and alexithymia. 
Alexithymia is known as a condition that makes it difficult for individuals to differentiate 
which emotion they are feeling. Approximately 50 percent of autistic children are also 
diagnosed with alexithymia but it is also prevalent in approximately ten percent of the 
general population and linked to eating disorders (Nowakowski, 2013) and substance 
abuse (Morie, 2016). Shah (2016) also suggests that impairments in self (socio-emotional 
perception or interoception) are associated with alexithymia and not a result of autism. 
Moreover, Bird and colleagues found that it is alexithymia that results in impaired 
empathy and is not associated with autism, which is in direct contrast to Theory of Mind 
(Bird et al., 2010). More research is needed to examine the role of autism in the use of 
pronouns and the relationship and stability of self and other concepts, but these findings 
indicate that autistic actors exhibit the “I” and “Me” and thus a self in conversation.  
First-hand Accounts of Empathy and Autism 
Since Theory of Mind suggests that autism prevents cognitive empathy and 
symbolic interactionism has not, then it was likely that empathic understanding would be 
found throughout autistic actors’ experiences and self-descriptions. In fact, this alleged 
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lack of empathy has been especially contested by autistic activists and scholars. During 
the analysis themes of empathy spontaneously emerged and it was therefore necessary to 
examine the context and expression of autistic empathy.  
 Several respondents provided descriptions of themselves as “kind” which can be 
understood as empathy is action. However, three respondents recounted social 
experiences and described feelings of empathy in individual interaction to reflect an 
understanding of others that sometimes transcended their immediate situation and 
demonstrated compassion not just for individual people but for people as members of 
humanity. For example, Ferguson recounted the mysterious arrival of an energy healer to 
his workplace:  
So, my boss, whom I love very much has a horrible, possibly 
terminal, okay she has a brain tumor. So, she’s, so that’s inoperable… She 
has a Reiki master come in …and I knew that if I took, knew that if I 
fucked up this lady’s attitude… When she came in I was like “What do 
you want? Who are you” and she was like “I’m looking for Dee” and I 
was like “She’s not here right now she’s probably in the back” and she 
was like “Oh I knew I was early” so I was like “Who are you just so I can 
tell her like who is here” and she was like “Oh I’m her Reiki master” and I 
just, I like, I don’t know if my face conveyed it but I heard like a death 
knell in my head. I was, to me I was face to face with a charlatan who was 
defrauding my boss. 
  
Ya know my boss didn’t have any real medical recourse for this problem, 
but she has like ritual that could calm her down and bring her peace. And I 
knew, I knew that if I fucked up this woman’s game that uh then it would 
affect the performance. So, I said nothing. So, my attitude, so a time that 
I’ve changed my mind I can see the value that this FRAUD is bringing to 
my boss because my boss has nowhere else to turn and it’s kind of like 
putting, it’s not like this person is putting off legitimate medical care, 
she’s just providing a service of comfort but the line between that and 
legitimate danger is pretty thin. Like who knows who this person is 
hurting through medical neglect. 
        




In this story the respondent is recounting how he made the decision to keep his 
skepticism to himself after realizing that the Reiki master provided his boss a comfort she 
likely could not find elsewhere. He realized that if he were to criticize Reiki medicine it 
would have upset his boss and he is aware that she is seeking “ritual that could calm her 
down and bring her peace.” The respondent also adjusts his behavior to protect the 
performance of the Reiki master. Moreover, when he says, “who knows who this person 
is hurting through medical neglect” he expresses that though he did not say anything after 
considering that his boss has a terminal illness in this particular interaction, he 
nonetheless wonders about the other people this “fraud” and “charlatan” may provide 
services for who could potentially be in danger. In this interaction, Ferguson actually did 
nothing. However, by interpreting his point view one can see that this is an expression of 
empathy-- one that could not be seen without an account of his perspective of the 
situation. This finding furthers the contention that first-hand accounts of autistic 
experiences must be centered to position autistic actors as the experts on their own 
experiences of self and sociality.  
Additionally, examples of empathy for the larger social community include two 
respondent’s choices of career. Bill (age 41) described his interest in working as a 
physical therapist stating “That's one of my motives for getting into physical therapy. To 
help people as best as I'm able to.” Patrick (age 27) a computer information technology 
scientist working on assistive technologies, described himself as: 
 …particularly interested in applying insights from the social 
sciences into what are traditionally stem areas of research. Such as 
applying the insights of social sciences to the development of technology 
for people with disabilities. So, making sure that when engineers are 
designing things they are also considering factors like stigmatization and 




Bill and Patrick made these statements in response to probes about how they 
thought of themselves rather than questions about their employment. This demonstrates 
that these three individuals saw empathic understanding as part of their self-concepts that 
directed their actions (as opposed to efforts to pass as neurotypical). To reiterate, these 
examples of autistic empathy were spontaneously provided in both their private 
encounters and their professional careers.  
Autistic empathy can be evidenced yet not necessarily through stereotypical overt acts—
at least among verbal autistic people with average or above average intellectual abilities.  
As stated before, it is a dangerous stereotype that autistic people lack empathy for which 
there is no scientific support.  
Komeda (2015) and colleagues contend that autistic people show greater levels of 
empathy toward other autistic actors under experimental conditions (p. 145-152). They 
argue that this suggests an “atypical form of empathy with ASDs towards others with 
ASDs” (Komeda, 2015). The theory of the double empathy problem suggests that autistic 
actors are perceived as lacking empathy because of a breakdown in mutual 
understanding-- not because of “autistic cognition deficits.” From a symbolic 
interactionist perspective this is supported by Scheff (2005, p. 158) who stated:  
 
… undecidability ignores the possibility that communication involves at 
its very core the process of taking the role of the other, of understanding 
the meaning of messages or texts not only from the receiver’s point of 
view but also from the sender’s.            
 
The findings in the present study reinforce the double empathy problem set forth 
by Milton and qualitatively support the findings of Bird and colleagues which concluded 
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that “not all individuals with an autism spectrum condition, but only subgroups with 
interoceptive deficits, seem to be impaired on the empathic route to social cognition. This 
finding agrees with earlier research pointing to a large heterogeneity in cognitive profiles 
within the autistic populations (Pellicano et al., 2006; Whitt et al., 2009a, b) and cautions 
against overgeneralization of deficits commonly attributed to autism spectrum conditions 
to every individual on the autistic spectrum” (Bird et al., 2010). Taken together, these 
findings are aligned with previous and current research, which suggests a better 
understanding is that autistic people experience, act on, and display empathy differently 
in ways that are often overlooked by neurotypical people. This supports the idea that 
symbolic interactionism provides a more nuanced framework. Now we turn to how 
autistic people may experience self and socialization differently by focusing on the 
concept of the looking glass self or how autistic senses of self emerge and develop from 
the real or perceived judgements of others. 
  
 The Looking-Glass Self 
Succinctly, the looking glass self means that we learn to see ourselves through the 
“reflections” of others. For Cooley, the archaic English word for mirror is nothing more 
than a metaphor for objective self-awareness. Theory of Mind or the inability to infer 
others states of mind would seem to prevent the looking-glass self process and the thus 
the development of a looking-glass self. The assumptions of ToM were not supported by 
the data in the current study. It was found in the excerpts that all respondents 
demonstrated the existence of the looking glass self.  
For example, when asked her opinions on gender roles Lydia stated “Yes, but I 
have been assured they aren’t very p.c (politically correct)”. The use of the term “p.c.” 
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here reflects the actor’s efforts to smooth interaction and demonstrates the internalization 
of the generalized other and its role in shaping actor’s conduct. Through previous 
interactions Lydia had learned that her honest answer which goes against the norm results 
in problematic interactions thus she writes her opinion off as “not p.c.” She has been 
socialized to understand society’s view of appropriate perspectives toward gender roles 
and is aware that she holds a different view. To illustrate following the three-step process 
of the looking glass self, in this situation Lydia has (1) imagined how her opinion on 
gender roles will appear to others; (2) imagined how others will judge her opinion, and 
(3) developed a self-feeling she described as “not p.c” and therefore judged her own 
opinion as an unfavorable response.  
When describing the looking-glass self Cooley emphasized that it was the actor’s 
interpretation of others’ perceptions, regardless of whether they make a misjudgment. In 
this example when probed further with the assurance that the interviewer welcomed her 
honest thoughts and opinions she responded “…let’s just move forward” an indication to 
the researcher to change the subject. Though I would not have judged her answer at all, 
least of all in the way she suspected, this demonstrates the symbolic interactionist tenet of 
the looking-glass self and how actors’ self-images are influenced by the real or imagined 
judgements of others. 
Through her observations of children at play and school Barrie Thorne suggested 
that children police each other such that dominant conceptions of masculinity and 
femininity are enforced and reproduced. Additionally, her work holds that parents and 
other socializing agents can challenge or reinforce the messages that children receive 
from their peers. For example, when asked, “Do you know how they say that somethings 
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are for girls and somethings are for boys? What do you think about that?” Kurt (26, male) 
provided an experience from elementary school which shows gender socialization in 
action and how the looking glass self and generalized other are dependent upon reference 
groups. 
 “(Laughing) Um I think it’s absolute garbage. Uh um, okay so… 
something anecdotal I could add to this, I guess. I used to have a doll. 
Umm it was one of my favorite toys because I loved snuggling up to it 
when I would go to bed, I guess. And I, I don’t know why. It was just very 
comforting. I couldn’t explain why today. So, I mean, people will get into 
that sort of thing. It shouldn’t worry any parent because I mean, I turned 
out pretty masculine I guess. I mean, but um, like I just think gender roles 
are weird. It’s like “you have these genitals, you’re gonna do these 
things!”. Like what exactly is the logic behind that, ya know?...I remember 
mentioning it once in class and everyone was like “Wait! You have a 
doll?” And I’m like “yeah”. And like I realized why that was probably not 
a wise thing to say but honestly I didn’t care…Like, I have a doll! So 
freaking what?! I mean, ya know! (laughing)” 
 
This example illustrates a young boy learning the gendered norms for appropriate 
toys. The reactions of his classmates indicated that a doll was not an appropriate toy for 
his gender. These students were participating in Kurt’s socialization, reflecting to him 
that a doll is not appropriate for a boy. Yet, it makes sense that Kurt would say that he 
didn’t really care at the time. Sociological research holds that in early childhood the 
family is the primary agent of socialization and that peers gain influence during 
adolescence. This illustrates the development of a generalized other and how actors 
construct the concept based on the appraisals of significant groups or specific people. 
Kurt later professed that neither his mother nor his father protested him having a doll or 
“at least I don’t remember them complaining about it” which had more of an impact on 
him than the ridicule of his classmates. Like Lydia, Kurt became self-aware that his 
conduct was against social norms.  
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It is believed that typically developing children become objectively self-aware 
between the ages of one and two years as indicated by recognition of themselves in a 
mirror. Research also indicates that autistic children exhibit a delay in this ability until the 
ages of 3-5 years (Bertenthal & Fisher, 1978). Moreover, ToM is also linked to directed 
gaze (Moll & Tomasello, 2004), object permanence (Moll & Tomasello, 2006), pronoun 
use (Hay, 2006), and mirror-self recognition. Ironically, literal mirror recognition 
experiments in psychological social psychology with children are also believed to 
demonstrate self-consciousness.   
Mitchell (2001) examined two theoretical models regarding mirror-recognition; 
the kinesthetic-visual matching model of Guillame and Gallup’s theory of self-
recognition as dependent upon a self-concept. He concluded that the “self-concept model 
is conceptually incoherent and makes inaccurate predictions from premises which are 
themselves inaccurate” and the kinesthetic-visual matching model better explains 
recognizing oneself in a mirror. Morin (2010) also criticizes the “fashionable” link 
between Theory of Mind, mirror-self recognition, and the self-concept arguing that 
“organisms that display MSR most probably do not possess introspective self-
awareness.”  
In contrast to ToM, symbolic interactionism holds different assumptions on self- 
and other- awareness. To the symbolic interactionist awareness of self and other are based 
on interactional experience not chronological age. It can be argued that mental age 
reflects interactional experience. According to SI, children have not developed the ability 
to take themselves as an object until they have passed through the play stage. At the ages 
of 18-24 months children are not capable of participating in role play and are typically 
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still in the preparatory store which is characterized by imitation and the learning of 
learning of gestures and symbols. The symbolic interactionist perspective is therefore 
already evidenced in studies which suggest that autistic children experience a delay in 
mirror self-recognition but that their performance matched that of their mental-age 
matched peers, i.e., children with a similar interactional age (Dunphy-Lelii & Wellman, 
2012).  
Van Themaat linked ToM to the symbolic interactionist concept of the looking 
glass self “with regards to the development of self-concept in children and young people 
with ASD.” She “considers how sensory processing difficulties in autism can potentially 
influence the development of early communication and interaction skills which will 
impact on an individual’s ToM abilities.” Van Themaat correctly posits that a 
consideration of the looking glass self has important implications toward the study of and 
treatment of autistic people and constitutes a shift from traditionally encouraged 
interactional dynamics. She suggests that:  
 
“This is in accordance with a stance like the interactive model of 
disability…the view that disability is the result of an interaction between 
an individual with a disability and society. What messages about their 
selves are we mirroring back to our learners with SEN as educators and 
significant others in their lives? Do we reflect back to them that we see 
children and young people with value and unique abilities who can play a 
meaningful part in their school, family and community; or do we reflect 
back to them a collection of deficits and passive dependence on others, 
and how does this influence the way they see themselves” (Van Themaat, 
2016, p. 4).  
 
Moreover, she notes that “this focus on the socio-communicative features of 
autism” is under-researched compared to approaches that attempt to modify behavior 
(Charman & Stone, 2006). Additionally, “the interest in interactive approaches with 
 
59 
individuals with autism follow trends and…grew out of a desire to move away from 
behavioral approaches and towards approaches in education that value process and 
understanding over product and skills” (Nind, 2000: 184; Van Themaat, 2016, p. 12). Van 
Themaat suggests that medical professionals, educators, and parents interacting with 
autistic children specifically should take care that “reflections must enable our learners to 
develop a self-concept that is meaningful to them and to see their difficulties not as 
deficits, but as a different, validated way of experiencing life” (2016, p. 13). This 
demonstrates that symbolic interactionism is useful in not only understanding autistic 
actors but is a valuable perspective in terms of informing and restructuring intervention 
and support.  
Role Taking  
A major criticism of studies examining theory of mind, perspective, and role 
taking abilities of autistic actors is that they are conducted experimentally and are 
therefore not comparable to real world social contexts (Loyd, 2011; Van Themaat, 2016). 
From a feminist perspective, marginalized people are often acutely aware that their 
subjective experience is distinct from the prevailing “cultural and micro-interactionally 
established definitions” (Ritzer, 2014, p. 438). Feminist scholars were the first to reject 
the traditional microsociological view of a “unified consciousness of everyday life” that 
is assumed. For example, Dorothy Smith highlighted how the everyday life of 
marginalized people, specifically women, can be understood as a divided reality where 
they develop along a fault line between their own subjective experiences and the 
established types available in the social stock of knowledge to describe that experience 
(Smith, 1979; 1987). Ritzer (2014, p. 438) summarizes how this experience may be 
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generalized to the subjectivity of all subordinated people in four key ways and how this 
effects role-taking and the conception of the generalized other: 
(1) Their experience for role taking is complicated by their awareness that they must 
learn the expectations of an other who by virtue of differences in power is alien.  
(2) They must relate not to a generalized other but to many generalized other in both 
the culture of the powerful and the various subcultures of the less empowered and 
the disempowered.  
(3) They do not experience themselves as purposive actors who can chart their own 
course through life—although they may be constantly told that they can do so, 
especially within the American ethos.  
(4) Most pervasively, they live daily with a bifurcated consciousness, a sense of the 
fault line between their own lived experiences and what the dominant culture tells 
them is a social reality.   
 
When we are very young we are only able to take the role of specific others. 
Mead’s theory of development suggests that procession through the play and game stages 
culminates in the development of the concept of the generalized other, whereby we adjust 
and conform our conduct to the standards of society according to the prescribed 
behaviors that accompany our social position—that is larger society provides guideline 
for how to coordinate our lines of action with others according to our role. Role taking 
means that we draw on these guidelines to have successful interaction.  Hewitt describes 
how the “generalized other is, like a role, a perspective that the person must 
imaginatively adopt in order to take it into account in forming his or her own conduct. It 
is made up of standards, expectations, principles, norms, and ideas that are held in 
common by the members of a particular social group” (2007, p. 69). For example, norms 
regarding gendered behavior and appropriate conduct in specific social settings such as a 
restaurant. The first example supports the contention that gendered socialization 
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experiences are like those of non-autistic children. The second example is highlighted to 
illustrate how the subjectivity of autistic actors often runs counter to prevailing norms.  
When asked the question “Where did you learn gender roles?” Bill recounted an 
exceptionally detailed experience of gender socialization and more specifically role 
taking. 
 I was like 10 and went to one of those fairs or whatever they are 
with the rides and carnies...a carnival. and I went there with these two girls 
who were like 12. I'm not sure why....it was something my aunt and uncle 
arranged, but it was fine with me.... believe me, I had no qualms. So, they 
wanted this prize that you get by knocking over cans with a ball and they 
tried a couple of times.... but then one of them said something like, "why 
are we trying to do this when we have this boy who can help us?" and at 
first, I'm thinking.... these girls are older than me, what are they talking 
about? but of course I wound up fulfilling my role as a boy and knocking 
down the cans multiple times and they got a bigger prize than they even 
wanted. I think it was the first time I realized that girls viewed boys and 
sort of that athletic, get the job done type....and that was the first time I 




In the following example, Ferguson recounts a recent event dining with coworkers 
at a hibachi grill which illustrates role-taking ability that transcended the situation to 
consider historical context: 
So I’m watching this guy who’s from China and goes by the stage name 
“Sexy Charles” who is ya know, doing this performance… We have a professor 
here at [local college] who specializes in like Asian culture or that sort of thing 
and something that his son said rang in my head while I was there. His son had 
leaned over to him and said “This is entertainment for colonizers”… So I had that 
quote in my head the whole time. I was just like “who is this guy?”, “how does he 
feel about this?”. And my boss is full-blooded Thai, and her parents are full-
blooded Thai and they were there. I have an Indonesian immigrant coworker and 
the rest of us are white as the fallen snow. So it was just really, it was 
uncomfortable for those reasons and it was just uncomfortable because I’d seen 
these moves, most of these moves and schtick a thousand times before. I’d seen it 




…I had no idea how this dude actually feels about what he does. Or what his 
perspective on it is is. Like “Sexy Charles” became an enigma to me. And I was 
like “surely his name isn’t Charles.” It just became sort of sad thing for me and I 
really didn’t like it and I was really uncomfortable. So there was that aspect to 
deal with. But I did want to support him as an entertainer because I know that a 
bitchy face can really sap your mojo. So, uh, I really tried but afterwards everyone 
got on me for my bitch face and my alleged attitude. 
         (Ferguson, 31) 
 
In this instance Ferguson is describing what he was actually thinking when his 
fellow dinner partners inferred negative evaluations of his affect and demeanor 
throughout the course of their dinner. This highlights Milton’s double empathy problem 
and provides Ferguson’s own interpretation of events and his mental state during the 
alleged social infraction. It turns out that, in symbolic interactionist terms, Ferguson was 
taking the role of other (the performer in this case) and empathizing with him both as an 
individual performer and with his social position (including a vast historical context) as a 
Chinese immigrant performing what he deemed “entertainment for colonizers” that made 
him uncomfortable which, despite Ferguson’s efforts, could be read through his 
paralinguistic communication.  
Ferguson was unable to devote his full attention to his body language because his 
mind was focusing on unraveling the “enigma” of “Sexy Charles.” In this instance 
Ferguson had no problem theorizing about the mind of Charles while at the same time 
struggled to manage the norms expected by his fellow dinner patrons. However, his 
dinner companions were wholly inadequate in their assessment of Ferguson’s internal 
mental state and were likely over-monitoring his behavior because he possesses the social 
label of autistic. In other words, they “failed” to “read” Ferguson’s mind and then 
sanctioned him socially for their own misguided judgements. 
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In this instance, the non-autistic dinner parties suffer from the problem of 
cognitive empathy. They were unable to “read” the mind of their fellow dinner patron and 
additionally made no attempt to consider the situation from the point of view of the 
Chinese immigrant despite many in attendance being Asian immigrants themselves. 
Milton defines the double empathy problem as a disjuncture in reciprocity between two 
differently disposed social actors and describes it as a “breach in the ‘natural’ attitude that 
occurs between people of different dispositional outlooks” (2012, p.3). In recent 
experimental research it has been shown that non-autistic participants are both unable to 
read the emotions of autistic people and tend to evaluate their sociality negatively. In this 
example, Ferguson’s coworkers did both. The underlying issue is lack of mutual 
agreement on what aspects Sexy Charles were salient. To Ferguson, it was the larger 
social context in which the performance occurred. For his coworkers, the norms 
regarding viewing the performance were more salient and Ferguson’s natural response to 
the performance and the context of the performance were first evaluated as wrong and 
then as rude. His coworkers ultimate understanding of the situation was that Ferguson’s 
behavior was indicative of “typical” autistic social deficits. From his perspective, we can 
see that was not the case and we can see the post hoc efforts Ferguson made to account 
for his behavior and manage his impression.  
Taking the Role of Other as Impression Management 
Another relevant issue emergent in the data involves autistic actors’ management 
of disclosing their diagnosis. Failure or reluctance to disclose an ASD diagnosis should 
be regarded as an effort to protect and control both internal self-concept and the external 
evaluations of self. It is an effort to control the definition of the situation and an example 
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of impression management that are only possible by taking the role of other. Because 
autistic sociality and communication is misunderstood and stigmatized, when autistic 
actors interact with non-autistic others they are subject to the threat of stereotyping. 
Attempts to control others’ images of our self demonstrates an awareness of others’ 
perceptions which do not match the individual’s self-assessment. How actors present 
their self and what actors choose to disclose to manage impressions is contextually 
specific. When asked about disclosing his diagnose, Matthew provided the following 
account for why he chose not to disclose:  
Concern about stereotyping. I’d say in general working in a stem 
field especially, something like math is pretty good camouflage. Because 
like, I just described my boss shouting profanity out of his office. There’s 
certainly lots of tolerance for idiosyncrasies let’s put it that way. And then 
so, if you’re a little socially awkward or don’t, like with me, you make a 
conversation… if I’m having a conversation with more than one person it 
is challenging to know when to talk and if you’re a little awkward like that 
people are willing to overlook it. At least in the departments that I’ve been 
in. And so generally not at work.  
       
 (Matthew, 32) 
 
On the other hand, Ferguson provided an example of choosing to disclose his 
diagnosis strategically in the workplace. Goffman described a formula for “disclosure 
etiquette” where “the individual admits his own failing in a matter of fact way, supporting 
the assumption that those present are above such concerns while preventing them from 
trapping themselves into showing they are not” (1963, p. 101). Ferguson describes this 
process as follows: 
It’s been like a card to excuse my awkwardness or my mismatched 
tone of voice or my uh, all these sorts of things. I would tell it to 
coworkers. Okay so the way I see it is that it’s my card to play…. So, for 
me to be like “oh that didn’t really come off the way I wanted to, and this 
person probably thinks that I hate them or that I that I think they’re a piece 
of shit” or that whatever. So, I’ll say like, I’ll throw the card down and say 
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here’s the deal. Like, this is something that I deal with and hopefully you 
understand now. But all I have to say is “I’m probably on the spectrum” 
and they’re like aware enough that they’re good with that. 
       (Ferguson, 31) 
 
Ferguson goes on to describe his reluctance to use this “card” at work because of 
the potential to complicate future interactions stating:  
 The reason that I’m conservative about using that card is because I 
don’t want my experience with them or their experience with me to be 
colored by that uh, by that label. Like ya know, I don’t want to be, for 
instance, not taken seriously. Like, I don’t know whatever preconceptions 
or popular culture conceptions might be applied to me.  
       (Ferguson, 31) 
 
Ferguson is highlighting that autism as a label can be perceived as stigmatizing 
(Huws & Jones, 2008) to others. Though he plays the card to excuse awkward behavior 
or to explain break downs in communication, he is hesitant to use it because cultural 
(mis)understandings of autism may color his future interactions and he seeks to avoid 
being stereotyped.  
Additionally, Patrick described another dynamic in situations of disclosing as an 
attempt to account for break downs in communication-- feelings of frustration. He stated: 
It’s frustrating to have to prove something like that. I don’t know. People, 
I don’t know it’s hard to explain why it’s frustrating. Because when 
people don’t believe that, that what I’m trying to explain is to some degree 
outside of my conscious control, umm, if I’m bringing it up it’s because I 
am behaving in a way that someone normally wouldn’t. And if they don’t 
believe that I have this diagnosis or something then they will ascribe it to 
something that I could change if I wanted to. Uh, which is, umm, which 
changes how they view me as a person. 
        
 (Patrick, 27) 
 
Here Patrick is describing how sometimes his attempts to explain his behavior as 
result of being autistic are met with disbelief by non-autistic people highlight the 
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problems associated with functioning labels. He attempts to convince non-autistic actors 
(with varying degrees of success) because he knows that otherwise they will assume that 
he is merely excusing bad behavior for which he has control over, when in fact he does 
not. For example, they may infer any number of negative valuations to his conduct such 
as rudeness, laziness, or lack of empathy.  
On the other hand, autism as a label can also be stigmatizing to one’s self when 
stereotypes about autism have been internalized within an individual’s concept of the 
generalized other. For example, one respondent, Kyle (age 21), revealed that he never 
disclosed that he was a “person with autism” to anyone not even friends. He described 
that he had only told one close friend on an occasion when that friend asked him to join 
the military. Kyle admitted to his friend that he was not “eligible because I’m on the 
autism spectrum” and then qualified his statement with “even though it doesn’t impact 
me much.” His reasoning was that he always wanted people to treat him as a person “like 
any other person.” Additionally, Kyle was offended by the interviewer’s use of the term 
autistic because he felt he was “smarter than that.” 
 When asked why he considered the term offensive Kyle replied that “someone 
being called autistic means that you’re calling them someone that can’t handle life at all, 
someone that doesn’t know how to take care of themselves and basically doesn’t know 
how to do most things that any of us can do.” This suggests that Kyle has internalized the 
stigma attached to the label of autism prevalent in larger Zeitgeist which reflects a 
misunderstanding of what it means to be autistic. Kyle described how in taking the role of 
other he came to fear that others would think that he would be unable to do things for 
himself, may need them to do things for him, that they would fail to show him respect “as 
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an adult,” and may possibly reject him and that he “wouldn’t want to be in that kind of 
position.” He sought to prevent these situations where his personhood was reduced by 
electing to never disclose his diagnosis to others.  
This respondent highlights the effect of stigmatization of autistic people. An 
unpublished thesis by Jessica Benham (2015) links the preference for “identity-first” 
terms including “autistic” as linked to the concept of disability pride which she explored 
as a critical component of personal identity that must be given salience to align one’s self 
with grassroots advocacy movements. When autistic people imagine how they are seen 
by others, that is, take the role of other and feel feelings of mortification as opposed to 
pride it has important implications—namely, the possibility of self-acceptance, self-
esteem, and self-efficacy, especially in terms of advocacy but more important, 
psychological well-being. To summarize, these findings suggest how taking the role of 
other in a world that devalues autistic identities effects the self-concept of autistic actors.  
Socialization and Self 
I think that the real me... the guy who'd go to the prom with 
somebody just to be nice... he doesn't somehow come across in real life or 
perhaps he gets misunderstood. 
        (Bill, 
41) 
 
To the symbolic interactionist, socialization is more than the process of an actor 
being taught and internalizing the norms of their social group. It is also a process that 
produces the ability to think in the symbols used by the actor’s social worlds thus 
enabling individuals to define situations, develop lines of action, and create joint acts 
with others to solve problems—the ability to think, act, and to interact. Interaction (either 
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with one’s self or others) is, in fact, the process in which the ability to think is expressed 
and therefore thinking shapes and is shaped by the interaction process. 
Primary socialization operates in two ways; actors’ unique biographies shape their 
individual experiences and each actor learns society’s rules and makes them their own. 
Denzin (1971) argues that socialization is bidirectional; that socializees and socializers 
(Sandstrom, Martin, & Fine, 2010) come together and jointly renegotiate the rules given 
their respective power. In this regard, the teacher is socialized as much as the student is. 
Socialization occurs through interaction with socializing agents and within social 
institutions, notably the family, the school and the media. Norms learned include 
appropriate conduct for performing roles in accordance with one’s social position. 
Primary socialization is uniform in the sense that most all people experience the process 
as one that leads to the development of self. On the other hand, secondary socialization 
refers to the learning of specific or formal training learned later in life and is largely skill-
based.  
 Research on stigmatization has been counterintuitive in many regards. For 
example, studies of disabled people have shown that they do not strongly identify with 
their disability and hold a positive self-image which may be (but was not mentioned) in 
contrast to other stigmatized identities such as for example, sex-workers (Olney & 
Brockelman, 2003; Watson, 2002). Watson (2002) and Milton (2014) suggest that some 
stigmatized individuals may question the discourse surrounding “normality” but it is 
assumed that Milton would disagree with any contention which suggested that being 
socialized into a stigmatized identity has little effect on a person’s understanding of self 
or other. He notes that “Autistic identities can be said to be constructed within a context 
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of an uneven distribution of power, with a medicalized view of autistic difference and 
remediation at times acting as a hindrance to feelings of wellbeing and belonging” 
(Milton, 2017). McLeod, Lewis, and Robertson (2008) found that autistic higher-
education students relied more on their first-hand experiences as more personally relevant 
and “conveyed strong self-images regardless of how or whether they identified with their 
diagnosis.” The authors linked this finding to the sample characteristics suggesting that 
their “relative privilege in achieving higher education and therefore experiencing success 
and achievement to their personal strengths.” The following section describes how the 
respondents in this study described their images of self. 
When asked the question “If someone asked me who you were, what would you 
want me to say?” respondents’ answers varied based on individuality. According to 
Kuhn’s original coding categories of the Twenty Statements Test, most respondents 
thought of themselves positively and primarily described themselves in terms of their 
personal traits, i.e., smart, intelligent, kindhearted, caring, laid-back, mellow, fun-loving, 
etc. Less than half of the respondents (four out of twelve) described themselves in terms 
of their physical traits with “handsome” or “good-looking,” “tall,” and “strong” being the 
only examples. Even fewer respondents described themselves in terms of their social 
roles with the only examples being student, parent, and researcher. Only one respondent 
used terms that would fall under Kuhn’s original coding category of “existential 
statements,” e.g., “I am not my body.”  
To illustrate how autistic actors perceived themselves take Cormac who described 
himself as “intelligent, interested in actuarial analysis, and confident.” He described 
himself this way because these were things that he was “very proud of.” Patrick described 
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himself as a researcher who was somewhat introverted and thought of himself this way 
because these were things that “dominated” most of his waking moments. Likewise, 
Matthew also described himself as a successful researcher who was “curious, driven, and 
especially interested biology” which he had made into a career.  
Benjamin thought of himself as “kindhearted and a good leader, someone who 
leads by example, who can coordinate and get things done.” Austin described himself as 
intelligent, kind, decent, caring, and respectable with a “low tolerance for horseshit” as 
well as a “snappy dresser.” Austin went on to qualify intelligent because of his 
audiographia. He believed that he gave the appearance of being intelligent because he 
was able to recall lectures or other things he had heard verbatim. He also described 
himself as a civil libertarian which he thought people should know because it related to 
his burgeoning career in the legal field and because he believed that this label let people 
know he was both principled and not easily offended.  
Ferguson, Kurt, and Chad described themselves as “weird” with Ferguson adding 
“I’m hyperdimensional, a fucking alien.” He meant this in the sense that he was varied 
from person to person and situation to situation. He further stated that he didn’t “really 
have an elevator pitch” for who he was. Kurt wanted to be described as weird “to get it 
out of the way.” However, for Chad, “weird” was associated with bravery. He stated that: 
 I can take some pride in being weird because being weird in the 
world takes some bravery, anyone can be normal and fade into the 
background, nothing brave about that. 
 
Similar to Ferguson’s admission that he didn’t really have what he called an 
elevator pitch, two women in this study gave short answers to the question and when 
probed asked to move on. For example, Lydia replied:  
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Sorry. I keep trying to answer like I know other people answer. 
People who say gamer, etc. But those are just things that I do. They’re 
actually just things lots of people do.  
 
Lydia is a single woman in her fifties with no children. Throughout the interview 
she discussed many of the interests and hobbies she has enjoyed throughout her life. She 
worked in the service industry and described as just a job such that it was not salient to 
her self-concept.  
Of note, no respondent in this study wished to be known or described by others as 
autistic. Importantly, respondents were asked to describe themselves to the interviewer 
and the nature of the interaction within the context of an autism research study served as 
confirmation that being autistic was already known. Bill said that being autistic was 
something he wanted people to know about him but that it was something he worked 
“extremely hard to hide.” So, this observation should not suggest that no respondent other 
than Bill regarded being autistic as an important part of their identity. It simply was not 
something they wished to be known or described as. However, this leads us to the next 
section on what it means to manage autistic ways of being, what Goffman referred to as 
“passing.”  
According to Goffman, people who share a stigma tend to have similar learning 
experiences which may have similar effects on their conception of self. Being socialized 
with a stigma produces a similar “moral career.” One phase of this socialization process 
is when a stigmatized person learns the dominant viewpoint regarding people with their 
stigma. Recall Kyle mentioned earlier who was offended by the word autistic and never 
disclosed his diagnosis to anyone outside the medical or support communities. For 
Goffman this meant “acquiring thereby the identity and beliefs of the wider society and a 
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general idea of what it would be like to possess a particular stigma.” Another phase of 
autistic socialization is when a person realizes they possess a stigma and slowly learns the 
consequences of possessing that particular stigma. The timing and the interplay of these 
two initial phases of the moral career form important patterns, establishing the foundation 
for later development, and providing a means of distinguishing among the moral careers 
available to the stigmatized.  
As mentioned previously, half of the respondents in the present study sought to 
seek a diagnosis in adulthood. Goffman suggests that:  
The stigmatized individual defines himself as no different from 
any other human being, while at the same time he and those around him 
define him as someone set apart. Given this basic self-contradiction of the 
stigmatized individual it is understandable that he will make some effort to 
find a way out of his dilemma, if only to find a doctrine which makes 
consistent sense out of his situation. In contemporary society, this means 
that the individual will not only attempt to hammer out such a code, but 
that, as already suggested, professionals will help out. (1963, p. 107) 
 
Huws and Jones (2008) asked autistic young adults to recall their experiences of 
having their diagnosis disclosed to them and their own perceptions of autism. Their study 
revealed the following themes; disclosure delay, providing explanations, potential effects 
of labeling, disruptions and opportunities, and acceptance and avoidance.  
The respondents in the present study differ in several key ways. First, the current 
study had a larger sample size. Second, all the respondents in the Huws and Jones study 
were under the age of 21 and diagnosed prior to that age. The ages at which respondents 
were diagnosed varied from early or middle childhood (6) to adulthood (6). The youngest 
age of diagnosis was four years while the oldest age was described as “late thirties.” Half 
of the respondents in the present study pursued diagnosis as an adult and were not 
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subjected to the “disclosure” talks that had to have been given by guardians. The 
perspectives given by Huws and Jones respondents may or may not reflect the 
experiences of the adult respondents in the present study. Therefore, the themes in their 
discussion converge and differ in important ways which allows us to consider the effect 
of diagnosis in adulthood and any additional themes in disclosure of diagnosis during 
adulthood. 
Moreover, the theme “acceptance and avoidance” should be markedly different 
when examining the role of age such that older persons who independently sought their 
diagnosis are less likely to experience avoidance. Only one respondent, Patrick, 
experienced “disclosure delay” and his response differs from the respondents in the 
previous study. Patrick was diagnosed at age 12 but this was not disclosed to him until 
the age of 21. He said that it didn’t come as a shock to him because he was already aware 
of having other diagnoses including dysgraphia, dyscalculia, and social communication 
disorder. These previous diagnoses may have provided a buffer such that one more label 
was not salient enough to affect his sense of self.  
Two respondents diagnosed as children reported coming to question their 
diagnosis in adulthood. Kyle stated that he didn’t he believe he was autistic. He described 
that he had matured since childhood and no longer needed the supports he had received 
as a young child. Kurt (age 27) who was diagnosed in the third grade stated: 
Sometimes honestly, I wonder if I actually do have it. I feel like 
there are times when I don’t quite fit the spectrum and then there are times 
when I’m like Mommy help I’m autistic! (imitating whining child, then 
laughs). But no, I realize that I have some social issues that I’m still trying 





 Of the six diagnosed as adults five had positive responses and regarded their 
diagnosis as helping to explain and contributing to their understanding of events in their 
past. Matthew was referred for diagnosis after receiving treatment for depression. He had 
suspected before that he was likely on the autism spectrum after learning about it and 
seeing parallels in his own experiences. Matthew reported feeling “vaguely satisfied” that 
his suspicions were confirmed. Lydia, who was diagnosed in her late thirties after a 
referral by neurologist treating her epilepsy stated that it “gave me something concrete” 
and “explained my behavior.” Likewise, Patrick felt that a diagnosis helped him to 
“contextualize who I am” and “explain my eccentricities and esoteric interests.” Bill felt 
that receiving a diagnosis enabled him to “find certain abilities that I have and enhance 
them.” 
Conversely, Chad, who independently pursued diagnosis at age 30, described 
receiving confirmation of the suspected diagnosis as making him feel “forlorn and 
empty.” He described feeling resentful of his parents saying he felt left to “develop 
coping mechanisms on my own.” He believed that if he had been diagnosed at a younger 
age he would have had access to external resources stating “a little accommodation 
would have been nice. Might not have ended up such a cold, weirdo loner.”  
 Ferguson was one respondent who stopped pursuing a diagnosis after the 
recommendations of loved-ones who were in the medical field (mother and friend) and an 
ex-girlfriend explaining:  
Now I’m just not sure what I really want to do with it. Because it’s 
something that I’ve sort of accepted. It’s brought me a little bit of peace 
just to accept it, to just say I’m probably on the spectrum has been useful 
just because it makes me feel like I have a greater understanding of 
myself. So, there’s this like suite of ideas. And recently I’m hearing about 




Despite the description of the growing number of adults receiving diagnosis as an 
“epidemic,” Ferguson demonstrates that many adults are aware of their neurodiversity 
and autistic traits but question the relevance or necessity of an official diagnosis to their 
daily lives or general well-being.  
To summarize, the respondents in this study diagnosed as adults paralleled the 
experiences of those in the Huw and Jones in certain ways and diverged in others. First, 
the respondents in this study did reflect similar accounts of the themes of concerns about 
labeling and diagnoses providing explanations for past experiences and disruptions and 
opportunities as revealed in the Huws and Jones study. Second, no respondents in the 
present study described feeling that their diagnosis disrupted any of their plans or as 
source of “new opportunities” (Huws and Jones, 2008, p. 103). This may be due to the 
fact that several students in the present study were already receiving accommodations and 
participating in therapy, however, so were the respondents in the 2008 study, thus they 
may have been thinking retrospectively. Third, one respondent in this study, Kyle, 
paralleled Huws and Jones experience of avoidance or wanting to distance himself from 
the label while nearly all others, by their accounts offered, accepted their diagnosis at the 
time of disclosure. Overall, the respondents in the present study held more positive views 
of their autism diagnosis than those in the Huws and Jones study. 
Learning to pass is the purpose of the most commonly used interventions such as 
Applied Behavior Analysis and constitutes one phase in the socialization of the 
stigmatized person and a turning point in their moral career. ABA is carried out by both 
professionals and parents. Attempts to manage autistic symptoms are also part of the 
everyday of adult autistic people. Goffman describes that some stigmatized individuals 
 
76 
may engage in unwitting passing before they are aware that they possess a stigmatized 
trait. To illustrate this example, Ferguson stated: 
 I spent a long time asking my friend “So what do normal people 
do when…” or how do, like I’d ask my boss and my coworkers at the 
time, like “how do normal people this or how do normal people do that or 
how do normal people respond when somebody does blank?” And like, I 
thought it was cute to say, ‘normal people’ but I had no idea how to say, 
“how do I pretend to be neurotypical”? 
 
The following excerpt serves as an example of Goffman noting that the 
stigmatized individual “attempts to correct his condition indirectly by devoting much 
private effort to the mastery of areas of social activity ordinarily felt to be closed off to… 
those with his shortcoming” (1963, p. 10). Although Ferguson spent most of his life 
unaware that he possessed a stigmatized identity, he did acknowledge that his way of 
interacting and communicating resulted in difficulties meeting and theorizing what 
expectations social situations may entail. He attempted to ameliorate and address these 
issues by asking for advice and input from people he deemed to have the skills he wished 
to possess and imitate. In a general sense of self-improvement and socialization, this is 
not much different from any actor referring to significant others as representative of a 
reference group. However, Ferguson’s admitted engagement in self-therapy is a step 
beyond that of a typical person and more akin to the antecedents and consequences of the 
process of self-labeling in mental illness based on the concept of “residual rule breaking” 
(Scheff, 1966). This parallels the work of Thoits and Scheff who describe that by taking 
the role of the generalized other, people assess their own behavior and when they label it 
as deviant and may engage in voluntary treatment seeking because they wish to improve 
their understanding of themselves in interaction to make goal-orientation easier. Being 
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able to align our actions with others to meet situational goals is indeed the purpose of role 
taking from a symbolic interactionist perspective.  
Additionally, many respondents were aware of their attempts at impression 
management and discussed their techniques. For example, one respondent even described 
himself as an actor stating: 
 I’m a decent actor. I sort of try not to come off as being socially 
awkward. I won’t talk. I’ve learned not to talk extensively about my weird 
fascinations, the stereotypically autistic things. But when I do try to 
explain my quirks, to contextualize them by explaining that I am on the 
spectrum people often don’t believe it because they have a preconceived 
notion, which is frustrating. 
       
 (Patrick, 27) 
 
Similarly, Bill described that impression management at work and school was 
exhausting and took a lot of effort but were necessary to achieving his goals. He 
described it as “pretending to be neurotypical.” Some of the techniques that Bill 
described were faking eye contact, using informal language, i.e., “I might not pronounce 
the word ‘thinking’ but instead say thinkin’, not using his natural monotone affect 
emphasizing his “Jersey accent” and remembering colleagues birthdays: “If I remember, I 
blend in more and people may overlook the areas where I don't blend in well.” What Bill 
may not recognize is that all people manage their impressions in similar ways in the 
context of work and school. Autistic people are no different from non-autistic people in 
terms of feeling social pressure to conform to idealized notions of professional and 
courteous, i.e., building rapport with clients and coworkers and speaking in a different 
tone of voice that conveys personability and joviality.   
A key point raised by Milton stresses the importance for autistic people to “experience 
ways of being that are compatible with their dispositions” (2013, p. 64). When autistic 
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people are forced to mimic or believe that they must mimic neurotypical behaviors it acts 
against their well-being (Milton, 2013; Milton, 2012; Bogdashina, 2001). For Goffman, 
passing and covering as  forms of impression management raised the issue of a “great 
psychological price, a very high level of anxiety, in living a life that can be collapsed at 
any moment” (1963, p. 87). These examples highlight the hidden labor and lengths that 
autistic people go to to successfully navigate and smooth interactions with non-autistic 
people which are in some ways distinct from the everyday interactions of neurotypical 
people. 
 
Chapter Six: Conclusion 
I undertook this study because of dual interest in microsociological concepts of 
the self and an interest in studying how inequality is perpetuated through language. Since 
the term autism first appeared, it has carried with it assumptions that autistic people are 
not just not “normal” people but that lack key elements of humanity. Generalizations 
about autistic deficiencies and disabilities have led social scientists studying autism down 
a path toward eugenics in the search for a cure. Examining how autistic people are 
discursively denied a self was of interest me because of my interactions with nonverbal 
and minimally verbal autists who undeniably exhibited a sense of self and other, 
cognitive and affective empathy, despite differences in perception and communication. 
The psychological literature on autism and lines of research often deny what can be 
observed in interaction and the experiences of autistic people. In contrast, symbolic 
interactionism as a perspective prioritizes both what is occurring in interaction and 
actor’s individual interpretations of their own experiences.  
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There are several important areas where this study makes an original contribution 
to the social science research of autism and the application of symbolic interactionism as 
a theoretical framework: 
 (1) From a symbolic interactionist perspective autistic people exhibit a self. They 
demonstrate the “I” and “Me,” exhibit the looking glass self, and take the role of other.  
(2) Symbolic interactionism is uniquely suited to validate autistic empathy by 
elucidating individual sense-making during interaction. 
 (3) Symbolic interactionism both supports and is supported by the conclusions of 
recent psychological and neurological studies that challenge or refute earlier 
understandings of autism—the hallmark of interdisciplinary research that integrates 
knowledge and strengthens lines of reasoning.  
Results and Limitations 
Like most research concerning autism, it was beyond the scope of this study to 
examine education, racial, or gender differences. This is due to the fact that women/girls 
and racial/ethnic minorities are less likely to be diagnosed. Moreover, diagnosis is costly 
which serves as a class barrier to understanding for the family and any subsequent 
support or accommodations.  
The design of this study purposefully confined level of education to those with 
some college experience. One respondent had obtained his doctorate. Two held a 
bachelor’s degree and one was graduating in the semester during data collection. One 
respondent held an Associate’s degree and five were on a plan toward obtaining their 
Bachelor’s. One respondent had attended college for two years but did not have plans to 
graduate. This study was also unable to consider class as most respondents’ parents 
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worked in professional fields requiring advanced degrees, many doctors themselves. All 
respondents were white and predominantly male. Only two respondents were women. 
The average age of respondents in years was 27.8. 
This study was designed to be exploratory and interpretive in nature. I argue that 
the sample size of twelve should not be considered small. The key in determining an 
adequate sample size for qualitative data is reliant not on numerical size but the concept 
of saturation. This study aimed to collect in-depth biographical narratives which resulted 
in more than 300 pages of conversation. One interview lasted eight hours. This study 
seeks to highlight individual experience but it would be unreasonable to generalize the 
experiences of these respondents as representative of all people on the autism spectrum or 
representative of any group the individual may be a member of. At the same time this 
thesis is framed on the intent to illustrate that the selves of these respondents are entirely 
representative of humanity writ large and that autistic actors share difficulties in sociality. 
There are several influences on how many interviews a researcher should conduct 
for a defensible qualitative study. Sampling continues until the researcher senses they 
have reached saturation (Guest et al. 2006; Mason 2010; Morse 1995). According to 
Bertaux, the researcher learns a great deal from the first several interviews. After this 
point the researcher recognizes patterns in the respondent’s experiences. Thus, additional 
interviews confirm what the researcher has already observed and documented. However, 
there can be no hardline rules to determine when saturation will or has occurred. Guest 
(2006) and colleagues found that 12 interviews of a homogenous group is all that is 
needed to reach saturation. The respondents in this study were predominately white, 
college educated males and the decision to end data collection in this case was influenced 
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by the additional following factors: interview structure and content (Guest et al. 2006); 
the complexity of the interviews (Ryan and Bernard 2006; the nature of the sample being 
limited by the sampling technique (Browne and Russell, 2003). 
 Due to practical constraints there were a number of factors associated with 
difficulty in recruiting. Length of interview was time consuming and interpersonal. 
Timing of data collection was inconvenient to adults currently enrolled or working full 
time jobs. These factors made the research design off-putting to many people who met 
the study criteria.  
Respondents had the option of a face-to-face interview, a face-to-face video call 
on Skype, a live-chat via Skype messenger, or an interview through an email chain. Each 
method has its own limitations but the element of preference of communication is 
important to this study. Because the flyer was distributed online there was a geographical 
limitation; in-person interviews were unfeasible for all but five respondents. Interviews 
conducted via chat or email were potentially a barrier to building rapport and observing 
paralinguistic behavior. However, anonymity in communication often makes some people 
feel freer to speak honestly and without fear of judgement. Though each interview 
method was unique, all interviews were successful and were the appropriate method for 
respondents who preferred the extra time to gather and articulate their thoughts. 
Suggestions for Future Research  
A sociological framework toward ASDs is necessary to examine the interactional 
processes between autistic and non-autistic people specifically in interactions with 
medical and education professionals. When it comes to the study of autistic selfhood we 
need to examine the discourse surrounding what selves are and examine what 
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interactional processes are being accomplished and which are not. Additionally, more 
research is needed to examine sticky situations using conversational analysis to determine 
underlying mental frameworks and sense-making mechanisms that may be atypical but 
successful nonetheless. This would theoretically support a difference but not deficiencies 
which validates autistic personhood.  
Future lines of research may involve the use of identity theory and affect theory to 
examine autistic self-concepts and how society influences the self-concept in autistic 
actors—not just cognitive processes and experimental tests. Although recent lines of 
research examining barriers to well-being, reshaping treatment and intervention with 
autistic input, theoretically we must also explore how autistic actors are able to 
successfully move through the social world in ways that accommodate autistic difference. 
Lastly, autism should be of particular interest to sociologists because it can reveal to us 
the taken-for-granted world of interest to phenomenologists and the social construction of 

























APPENDIX B: Interview Guide 
 
1. If someone asked me who you were, what would you want me to tell them? Why? 
 
2. Tell me about your life as a college student? Where do you live? What is your 
room like? Why? In what ways is your life different from when you lived at 
home? 
 
3. What is your first/earliest memory? Tell me about your life as a child and your 
family? Who did you live with? Who took care of you? Did you have cousins, 
aunts and uncles, or babysitters or others who you felt safe with? What did you do 
after school? 
 
4. You know how they say that some things are for girls and others are for boys? 
What do you think about this? Who taught you these things?  
 
 
5. What did you like to play or play with when you were younger? Please describe 
your favorite games or activities? Why? How many friends did you have? Do you 
remember playing with other kids? What sorts of games or activities did you play 
with friends? Why did you play/enjoy that game/activity?  
 
6. Tell me about going through elementary, middle, high school? What memories of 
this time do you recall or consider important events you will never forget? Why? 
How did that make you feel? 
 
7. Tell me about how you spend your free time. What about the people you are 
friends with now? What qualities do you look for in a friend? Do you have a best 
friend? What makes NAME more special than the others? 
 
8. Can you tell me about a time that you “changed your mind?” What happened? 
Why did you change your mind?  
 
9. Are you interested in relationships with anyone? Why? What would the perfect 





10. What are your favorite magazines, books, commercials, television shows, or 
movies. Why? Favorite characters? Why? Role models? Why?  
 
11. What do you worry about? Why? 
 
12. Who do you respect? Why? Who would you not want to disappoint? Why? Can 
you say why you care so much about NAME? 
 
13. When did you receive an official autism diagnosis? How did that make you feel? 
How do you feel about it now? Why?  
 
14.  Where do you think you will be five years from now? Why? What do you hope 
for the future? Why? 
 
15. Is there anything you would like others to know about the thoughts and feelings of 
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